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POLYAMORY AS A SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Ann E. Tweedy* 
This Article examines, from a theoretical standpoint, the possibility of 
expanding the definition of “sexual orientation” in employment 
discrimination statutes to include other disfavored sexual preferences, 
specifically polyamory.  First, it examines the current, very narrow 
definition of sexual orientation, which is limited to orientations that 
are based on the sex of those to whom one is attracted, and explores 
some of the conceptual and functional problems with the current 
definition.  Next the Article looks at the possibility of adding 
polyamory to current statutory definitions of sexual orientation, 
examining whether polyamory is a sufficiently embedded identity to be 
considered a sexual orientation and the degree of discrimination that 
polyamorists face.  After concluding that such an expansion would be 
reasonable, the Article briefly outlines some issues for further 
investigation, including potential policy implications and the 
conflicting evidence as to whether polyamorists want specific legal 
protections. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses, from a theoretical standpoint, the question of 
whether the definitions of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination laws, 
particularly employment discrimination statutes,1 should be amended to 
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Gowri Ramachandran, and Mary Anne Case for reviewing and commenting on drafts of this Article.  
The author would also like to thank the participants at the 2009 Lavender Law Conference, the 2010 
Law and Society Annual Meeting, and the Fourteenth Annual Conference for the Association of the 
Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, as well as members of Michigan State University College of 
Law’s Triangle Bar Association and the faculty at Michigan State University College of Law for 
opportunities to present this material and for the very helpful feedback I received.  The author is also 
grateful to Jeffery Mingo, Carol Guess, Barbara O’Brien, and Cynthia Lee Starnes for sharing their 
thoughts and ideas about the Article.  Finally, the author would like to thank the Seattle Bisexual 
Women’s Network for making space for the discussions that planted the seed for this Article. 
 1. This Article focuses on the possibility of amending state statutory definitions of sexual 
orientation because, if a change in the definition of sexual orientation is warranted, state statutes make a 
good starting point for several reasons.  First, state legislative change tends to be easier to accomplish 
than federal legislative change.  Second, many states already statutorily protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination, whereas the federal government does not yet do so.  And, third, the Supreme 
1
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more broadly define the term to encompass a wide range of preferences, 
rather than being solely based on the sex of those to whom one is 
attracted.  More specifically, this Article asks whether polyamory—a 
preference for having multiple romantic relationships simultaneously—
should be defined as a type of sexual orientation for purposes of anti-
discrimination law. 
By way of background, I originally got the idea for this Article 
several years ago as a result of participating in discussions about identity 
within the bisexual women’s community in Seattle.  Specifically, one 
woman said that she defended her bisexuality in discussions and 
arguments much more strongly (and much more often) than she did her 
polyamory,and she wondered why that was.  Another woman responded 
that people commonly feel that some aspects of themselves are more 
important than others, and thus more worthy of defense, giving an 
example of an identity that the first speaker could espouse and defend 
but had not.  This discussion made me question whether polyamory was 
in fact an identity roughly on par with bisexuality and other sexual 
orientations and then, relatedly, led me to question (1) what constitutes a 
sexual orientation and (2) whether polyamory should be considered a 
sexual orientation in its own right.  This Article is an attempt to begin to 
answer these questions. 
Part II of this Article critically examines the societal and legal 
concept of sexual orientation, using legal theory to explore how the 
concept, as it is currently constructed, came into being.  Part II also 
examines the implications of this construction.  Next, Part III examines 
polyamory, including the degree to which it is embedded as an identity 
Court has not yet affirmatively espoused the view that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than joining the Court’s due process analysis, to a statute that 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); cf. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 
813 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Having carefully considered Lawrence and the arguments of the parties, we hold 
that Lawrence requires something more than traditional rational basis review [in application of the Due 
Process Clause] and that remand is therefore appropriate.”).  Until sexual orientation is explicitly 
granted such heightened scrutiny, expanding definitions of sexual orientation to include other types of 
preferences is likely to result in little, if any, gain in the equal protection context for these newly added 
groups. 
  Finally, the focus on employment discrimination derives from the fact that employment is 
one of the most commonly protected contexts in anti-discrimination law.  Thus, state anti-discrimination 
statutes that pertain to employment were chosen as the preliminary setting within which to examine the 
questions addressed by this Article.  It is hoped, however, that this analysis will be largely transferrable 
to other contexts. 
2
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and the degree of discrimination that polyamorists face.  Part IV 
explores the pros and cons of broadening the definition of sexual 
orientation to include polyamory. 
II. THE MEANING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
This Part first looks at the current meaning of sexual orientation in 
American culture and then turns to the apparent arbitrariness of the 
term’s current definition.  Next, it examines the practical and conceptual 
problems posed by the current definition, relying on the work of 
theorists such as Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, and others.  These 
issues are raised in order to help determine whether it makes sense to 
expand the current definition of sexual orientation to include other 
sexual preferences such as polyamory. 
A. The Current Meaning 
Today, sexual orientation is almost universally understood to signify 
whether a person is attracted to members of the same sex, the opposite 
sex, or both sexes.2  Thus, of the twenty-one states that had statewide 
statutes in place as of July 2010 prohibiting discrimination in 
employment based on sexual orientation,3 the eighteen states that 
statutorily defined sexual orientation defined it in terms of 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality.4  However, two 
 2. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Law, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (2006) (“While there is disagreement over how to categorize different 
sexual minority groups, little disagreement exists over the definition of sexual orientation itself.  
According to the American Heritage Dictionary, sexual orientation is the ‘direction of one’s sexual 
interest towards members of the same, opposite, or both sexes,’ and it seems that this definition is 
widely accepted.” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS & POLICIES (2010), 
available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf. 
 4. CAL. GOV. CODE § 12926(q) (West 2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, and bisexuality.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2011) (“‘Sexual 
orientation’ means a person’s orientation toward heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or 
transgender status or an employer’s perception thereof.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a (West 
2011) (“‘[S]exual orientation’ means having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or 
bisexuality, having a history of such preference or being identified with such preference, but excludes 
any behavior which constitutes a violation of part VI of chapter 952.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 4502(13) (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ exclusively means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or 
bisexuality.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having a preference for 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality, having a history of any one or more of these preferences, 
or being identified with any one or more of these preferences.  ‘Sexual orientation’ shall not be 
construed to protect conduct otherwise proscribed by law.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(14) (West 2011) 
(“‘Sexual orientation’ means actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.”); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (West 2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means a person’s actual or 
3
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significant variations exist.  First, some of these same states also 
included gender identity as part of sexual orientation,5 and, second, as 
perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, homosexuality or gender identity or expression.”); MD. CODE 
ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-101(f) (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means the identification of an individual 
as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 
Subdiv. 44 (West 2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having or being perceived as having an emotional, 
physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard to the sex of that person or having or 
being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being perceived as having a 
self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.  ‘Sexual 
orientation’ does not include a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult.”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 613.310(6) (West 2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having or being perceived as having an 
orientation for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(XIV-
c) (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having or being perceived as having an orientation for 
heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.  This definition is intended to describe the status of 
persons and does not render lawful any conduct prohibited by the criminal laws of this state or impose 
any duty on a religious organization.  This definition does not confer legislative approval of such status, 
but is intended to assure basic rights afforded under this chapter.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(hh) (West 
2011) (“‘Affectional or sexual orientation’ means male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or 
bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or being perceived, 
presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 28-1-2(P) 
(West 2011) (“‘[S]exual orientation’ means heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, whether 
actual or perceived[.]”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2011) (“The term ‘sexual orientation’ 
means heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or asexuality, whether actual or perceived.  However, 
nothing contained herein shall be construed to protect conduct otherwise proscribed by law.”); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 28-5-6(15) (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having or being perceived as having an 
orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.  This definition is intended to describe the 
status of persons and does not render lawful any conduct prohibited by the criminal laws of this state nor 
impose any duty on a religious organization.  This definition does not confer legislative approval of that 
status, but is intended to assure the basic human rights of persons to obtain and hold employment, 
regardless of that status.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 49-60-040(15) (2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender expression or identity.  As used in this 
definition, ‘gender expression or identity’ means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, 
self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, 
appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned 
to that person at birth.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13m) (2009) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means having a 
preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or 
being identified with such a preference.”); see also D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(28) (2011) (“‘Sexual 
orientation’ means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or 
practice.”). 
  Of these nineteen definitions (including the District of Columbia’s), only Minnesota’s 
definition appears to be different in that, taken literally, its requirement of attraction “without regard to 
the sex of” the object of attraction would appear to require a certain kind of bisexuality to qualify as part 
of the protected class.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 Subdiv. 44 (West 2011).  While the issue does not 
appear to have been raised directly, courts interpreting the law appear to view the definition as covering 
homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender identity, thus rendering it functionally equivalent to other 
statutory definitions of sexual orientation.  See, e.g., Lussier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-1395 
ADM/RLE, 2007 WL 2461932, at *6–*7 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2007); Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 
717, 722–25 (2001); Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n, No. 03-12062, 2004 WL 5621995 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 12, 2004). 
 5. See. e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 
§ 4553(9-C) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 49-60-040(15) (2011). 
  The inclusion of gender identity as a type of sexual orientation in some state statutes does 
broaden the definition of sexual orientation, see, for example, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) 
4
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will be discussed in more depth later, some states included identity or 
perceived identity as an aspect of, or the basis of, the definition.6  The 
remaining three states did not statutorily define the term in their anti-
discrimination provisions.7 
Therefore, aside from some states’ inclusion of gender identity in the 
definition of sexual orientation and some states’ requirement of 
identification or perceived identification with a particular orientation, 
these statutory definitions are unanimous in their basic conception of 
sexual orientation.  Moreover, both the proposed federal Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act8 and the dictionary use similar definitions.9  
Collectively, these largely identical definitions reflect a cultural 
agreement that the term sexual orientation describes the sex of those to 
(West 2011), but it also muddies it to some extent because gender identity is not a true sexual preference 
at all, given that it does not imply anything about types of people that one would be attracted to or the 
sexual practices that one would want to engage in.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE OF 
THE WORKPLACE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2006–2007, at 11 
(2007), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/State_of_the_Workplace.pdf (“Gender identity is 
generally defined as an individual’s internal, personal sense of being a man or a woman . . . . Gender 
identity and sexual orientation are not the same.  Transgender people may be heterosexual, lesbian, gay, 
or bisexual.”).  Conceptually, it appears to be preferable to protect gender identity separately from 
sexual orientation.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(10), (14) (West 2011) (distinguishing between 
sexual orientation and gender identity).  This conceptual distinction is potentially important given that 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) persons are often erroneously associated with gender deviant behavior, 
and gender deviant persons are often assumed to be lesbian or gay.  See, e.g., Todd Brower, Social 
Cognition ‘At Work:’ Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay Identity in Title VII, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 
1, 39, 62 (2009); cf. LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE AND 
DESIRE 43 (2008) (“[T]here is . . . evidence for a link between gender atypicality and same-sex 
sexuality, . . . among some individuals.”); id. at 45 (“[G]lobal associations between same-sex sexuality 
and gender atypicality are unsupportable.”). 
 6. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a (West 2011) (“‘[S]exual orientation’ means 
having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such 
preference or being identified with such preference, but excludes any behavior which constitutes a 
violation of part VI of chapter 952.” (emphasis added)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(14) (West 2011) 
(“‘Sexual orientation’ means actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.”); MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-101(f) (West 2011) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means the identification of an 
individual as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”). 
 7. The three states that protect against sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace but do 
not appear to statutorily define the term are Massachusetts, Vermont, and Oregon.  See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 495 (2011). 
 8. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(9) (2009) (“The term ‘sexual orientation’ means 
homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”); S. 1584, 111th Cong., § 3(a)(9) (2009) (“The term 
‘sexual orientation’ means homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”). 
 9. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2006), available at 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/medical?va=sexual+orientation&x=31&y=5 (“[T]he 
inclination of an individual with respect to heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual behavior.”); see also 
Lau, supra note 2, at 1286 (“According to the American Heritage Dictionary, sexual orientation is the 
‘direction of one’s sexual interest towards members of the same, opposite, or both sexes,’ and it seems 
that this definition is widely accepted.” (footnote omitted)). 
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whom a person is attracted.  The salience of the term in our culture in 
turn implies that the sex of the objects of each person’s attraction says 
something important about her or him. 
B. Interrogating the Origins and Implications of the Current Meaning 
Although this basic definition of sexual orientation, with its attendant 
implications, is so common as to be taken for granted as correct, there is 
nothing intrinsic about either the noun “orientation” or the adjective 
“sexual” that would tie the term specifically to the sex of those to whom 
a person is attracted.10  Instead, as scholars such as Dr. Ruth Hubbard 
have explained, in the abstract, the limited use of the term employed in 
common usage appears to be somewhat arbitrary: “the use of the phrase 
‘sexual orientation’ to describe only a person’s having sex with 
members of their own, or the other, sex obscures the fact that many of us 
have other strong and consistent sexual orientations—toward certain hair 
colors, body shapes, and racial types.”11  Indeed, as Michel Foucault 
argued, it appears that our contemporary cultural understanding of the 
concept of sexual orientation is rooted in the late 1800s, when, as 
regulation of sexuality increased, those who practiced sodomy began to 
be imputed with certain essential (and societally undesirable) 
characteristics: 
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a 
category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the 
juridicial subject of them.  The nineteenth-century homosexual became a 
personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a 
type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy 
and possibly a mysterious physiology.  Nothing that went into his 
composition was unaffected by his sexuality. . . . It was cosubstantial with 
him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature. . . . [T]he 
 10. For instance, the most relevant dictionary definitions of the word “orientation” appear to be 
“the settling of a sense of direction or relationship in moral or social concerns or in thought or art” and 
“choice or adjustment of associations, connections, or dispositions.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2002), available at http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/cgi-bin/unabridged?va=orientation.  Neither does the relevant definition of “sexual” 
particularly relate to the sex of those to whom one is attracted: “of or relating to the sphere of behavior 
associated with libidinal gratification.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 
UNABRIDGED (2002), available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/unabridged?va= 
sexual. 
 11. Ruth Hubbard & Elijah Wald, Gay Genes?, in RUTH HUBBARD, PROFITABLE PROMISES: 
ESSAYS ON WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND HEALTH 83 (1994).  See also JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER, LOOK 
BOTH WAYS: BISEXUAL POLITICS 195–96 (2007) (“[S]ome lesbians date only bi women; you could call 
it a sexual preference.”); id. at 216 (“Ellen [DeGeneres] did prove more recently with Portia de Rossi 
that dating straight-looking blond starlets is, if anything, her sexual orientation.”). 
6
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psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was 
constituted from the moment it was characterized . . . less by a type of 
sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain 
way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself.  
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was 
transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, 
a hermaphrodism of the soul.  The sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species.12 
In other words, the contemporary notion of sexual orientation and the 
importance this notion carries in American culture in terms of individual 
identity appear to be a product of late nineteenth century prejudice that 
sought to radically other13 individuals who engaged in homosexual 
practices.  As Foucault indicates, this process was so successful that the 
importance of the sexual practices themselves was supplanted by the 
notion of homosexual identity.  Thus, prejudice itself appears to have 
been responsible both for cementing the idea of the homosexual as 
someone who was inherently different from “normal” straight culture 
and for initially creating the notion of homosexual identity. 
While the idea of homosexuals’ having separate identities persists 
today, in contemporary rubric, the notion of the lesbian, gay, or bisexual 
person (LGB)14 as inherently different is employed by both sides of the 
gay rights movement, rather than serving solely as a tool of those who 
would oppress or marginalize members of the queer community.  For 
example, conservatives who are hostile to gay rights, such as marriage 
equality, emphasize the differences between LGB persons and 
themselves in order to justify arguments that existing rights should 
remain exclusive to heterosexuals.15  Similarly, many LGB people 
 12. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 37, 42–43 (Vintage 
Books ed., 1990) (emphasis added); see also DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 43; Hubbard & Wald, supra 
note 11, at 82; accord Brower, supra note 5, at 62 (“Openly gay people have cross-gender behaviors 
misattributed to them even if they are not gender atypical.”). 
 13. For a description of the psychological process of othering, see, for example, Jonathan Todres, 
Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 605, 611–18 (2009).  As Professor 
Todres explains, othering occurs, especially in individualist cultures, at both the individual and 
collective levels, and 
  At both . . . level[s], this Self/Other dichotomy functions to create (1) a devalued and 
dehumanized Other, enabling differential treatment of the Other; (2) a conception of a 
virtuous Self and corresponding assumption that the Self (or dominant group) is 
representative of the norm; and (3) a distancing of the Other from the Self. 
Id. at 613–14. 
 14. While I believe that transgenderism should be protected against discrimination, I do not 
address it here because it is conceptually distinct from even a broad view of sexual orientation.  See, 
e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 5. 
 15. See, e.g., Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, at 8, 
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/938xpsxy.asp (citing 
7
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celebrate their differences from mainstream, straight culture, thus 
perhaps choosing to live in metropolitan neighborhoods that have large 
populations of sexual minorities or criticizing heterosexual norms.16 
Despite the fact that many LGB people have themselves embraced the 
idea of an essential queer identity,17 the concept as currently constructed 
is problematic in several ways for LGB people and others.  Given the 
scope of these problems, it may ultimately be beneficial to LGB people 
to move beyond the current, narrow view of sexual orientation and 
establish a more holistic notion.  The next subsection discusses several 
of the problems that the essentialist view of gay identity poses for LGB 
people.  This discussion is followed by a look at some of the conceptual 
problems with the identity category itself. 
1. The Minoritizing View of Essential Gay Identity and the Problems it 
Poses for LGB People 
On a theoretical level, as Janet Halley explains, within “modern pro-
gay movements,” there can be said to be two distinct ways of looking at 
identity-based thinking: minoritizing and universalizing.18  Under the 
minoritizing view, which incorporates the idea of LGB people as 
inherently different, “homosexual and heterosexual modes of life are 
understood to be taxonomically and socially distinct.”19  The 
minoritizing understanding includes “civil rights models of homosexual 
gay male promiscuity as a reason to restrict marriage to heterosexuals, the idea being that allowing gay 
men to marry will result in a devaluation of the norm of monogamy among married people overall). 
 16. See DAVINA COOPER, CHALLENGING DIVERSITY: RETHINKING EQUALITY AND THE VALUE 
OF DIFFERENCE 47 (2004) (“[P]ride movements oriented around race, gender, [and] 
sexuality . . . highlight the ways in which subordinated or oppressed identities have been consciously 
revalued and reclaimed . . . .”); accord Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 55 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (“[S]ubstantial groups of 
women and men . . . have found that the normative category ‘homosexual’ . . . does have a real power to 
organize and describe their experience of their own sexuality and identity . . . .”); Nathan Patrick 
Rambukkana, Uncomfortable Bridges: The Bisexual Politics of Outing Polyamory, 4 J. BISEXUALITY 
141, 149 (2004) (discussing “a tendency in subcultural groups to privilege the authentic, the anti-
mainstream—in a word, the underground” (citation omitted)). 
 17. See, e.g., Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1520 
(2009).  The classic dichotomy between sexual orientation or identity types is that between essentialist 
and socially constructed identities or orientations.  See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 19–21.  Some 
social science researchers, however, argue that it is more accurate to see identity as a combination of 
both physical-biological and socio-cultural factors.  Id. at 22. 
 18. Janet E. Halley, ‘Like Race’ Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY: NEW WORK ON THE 
POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 48 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000).  Halley borrows the concepts of 
minoritizing and universalizing understandings from Eve Sedgewick.  See, e.g., Sedgwick, supra note 
16, at 56–58 (discussing minoritizing and universalizing views of gender and sexual orientation). 
 19. Halley, supra note 18, at 48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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difference,”20 such as the marriage equality movement,21 as well as “gay 
identity, essentialist, [and] third-sex models.”22  By contrast, the 
universalizing understanding “suppose[s] homoerotic potential to be 
characteristically human.”23 
Because the ability of a given class of plaintiffs to succeed in bringing 
anti-discrimination claims derives largely from the group’s ability to 
successfully analogize their situation to that of an oppressed racial 
group,24 the minoritizing understanding, with its view of sexual identity 
as similar to race,25 has obvious utility for the LGB rights movement.26  
At the same time, however, the minoritizing view of LGB identity is 
problematic in a number of ways.27 
The most important set of problems for the purposes of this Article 
 20. Id. 
 21. While not explicitly describing it as such, Nancy Polikoff demonstrates that the marriage 
equality movement is minoritizing in that it breaks with the gay rights movement’s prior coalitions with 
other groups to obtain rights for diverse families, focusing instead on LGB access to marriage as it now 
exists.  NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER 
THE LAW 7, 103–05, 107, 152 (2008); see also Schmeiser, supra note 17, at 1521 (“These days, few 
proponents of same-sex marriage predicate their strongest claims to access for gay and lesbian couples 
on the argument that this bundle of state-sponsored benefits should be broadly available to diverse 
family forms.”); accord Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 24) (“The debate about legally recognizing same-sex marriages is, at its root, a debate 
about category preservation.”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1690590. 
 22. Halley, supra note 18, at 48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS 49–50 (2008) (“To claim that one’s group is like 
African Americans is to reach for the brass ring in the context of constitutional rights under the 14th 
Amendment’s equal protection clause. . . . Policy development in civil rights traces the power of the 
‘like race’ analogy, with groups who were most able to make the analogy convincingly also more easily 
able to achieve the same policy benefits . . . that had been designed with black Americans in mind.”); id. 
at 16 (Under Title VII, “gender difference has borne an unsteady and derivative relationship to racial 
difference. . . . Gender has never really made a good analogy to race, and as a result judges have had to 
come up with somewhat awkward ways of talking about when it should and should not be allowed to 
make a difference.”); accord Schmeiser, supra note 17, at 1508 (“Immutability first surfaced as a 
litigation strategy in equal protection cases to highlight parallels between racism and sexism . . . as 
irrational prejudices predicated on stereotypes and unfounded assumptions.”); Kenji Yoshino, 
Assismilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,’ 108 YALE L.J. 485, 559–61 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court’s approach to equal protection 
analysis under which “new groups are admitted by showing that they are like groups that have already 
established their claim to protection”). 
 25. See Halley, supra note 18, at 49–50. 
 26. But see id. at 53 (criticizing the use of an immutability argument in the context of the 
struggle for LGB rights because “the resulting antidiscrimination case law could have left bisexuals out 
in the cold: after all, they can switch.  And this is not merely a risk of future harm: the decision to run 
[the immutability argument] displaced bisexuals as outsiders, nonmembers of the constituency on whose 
behalf gay and lesbian advocates spoke.”). 
 27. See generally id.; see also Schmeiser, supra note 17, at 1521. 
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pertains to how the minoritizing view of identity can affect LGB people 
and others’ perceptions of them.28  For instance, emphasizing the 
minoritizing view tends to deny, suppress, or hide other aspects of the 
realities of LGB lives.29  Thus, overemphasis of the minoritizing view 
may whitewash the richness and complexity of LGB identity in order to 
project a more monolithic identity that will be presumably saleable in a 
courtroom and in other contexts involving outsiders.30  This is damaging 
to LGB people whose identities do not conform to the accepted identity 
and whose realities therefore become obscured.  Relatedly, this pressure 
to project a certain kind of gay identity can be oppressive to queer 
people in the sense that they face pressure to conform to the correct 
queer identity script.31  Additionally, as Janet Halley explains, taking the 
minoritizing view to the extreme also creates the more insidious danger 
of remaking how LGB persons understand themselves: 
This tendency reached its apogee when gay-rights advocates claimed that 
some very preliminary and equivocal scientific studies suggesting that 
human sexual orientation might have some biological components proved 
decisively that homosexuality was a biological trait (supposedly like 
race).  The coherentist criticism of these arguments would be that they are 
inaccurate.  But they may have been worse than that: they may have 
“made up people” in the sense that they persuaded gay men and lesbians 
that they were “like that.”  I think they did.  In fact, I think they created a 
demand for gay gene experiments, which, in turn, did a great deal of 
interpellating on their own.32 
 28. An additional set of problems with the notion of an essential gay identity posited by the 
minoritizing view relates to the fact that, as a legal strategy, the minoritizing view has the potential to 
negatively affect other groups, such as racial groups, whose identities gay rights advocates rely on by 
analogy.  Halley, supra note 18, at 54–64.  These problems are generally beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 29. Id. at 52. 
 30. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 21, 44 (2010) (“When we think outside the white-picket-fence plaintiffs’ box, people are 
afraid of the prospect of plaintiffs far removed from the norm . . . .”). 
 31. Halley, supra note 18, at 42–43 (quoting K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: 
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM 162–63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1994)); accord Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 
READER 308 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (“[I]dentity categories tend to be instruments of 
regulatory regimes whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying 
points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression . . . . To install myself within the terms of an 
identity category would be to turn against the sexuality that the category purports to describe.”); cf. Ann 
Tweedy, Ignoring Childhood Messages and Breaking the Rules of Feminism and Professionalism: The 
Femme as World-Straddling Outlaw, in 2 VISIBLE: A FEMMTHOLOGY 44 (Jennifer Clare Burke ed., 
2009) (describing how feminism can make similarly oppressive demands on women). 
 32. Halley, supra note 18, at 52 (footnote omitted).  See also id. at 43 (acknowledging that 
identity politics can make people “become [what] they would not otherwise be”); Hubbard & Wald, 
supra note 11, at 83–84 (noting that “the search for gay genes comes directly out of the successes of the 
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Thus, an essentialist view of gay identity can be dangerous in the sense 
that it may actually remake some members of the queer community into 
people that conform to that identity because they come to believe that 
the prescribed identity necessarily describes them.  Finally, taking 
Foucault’s point that the idea of an essential gay identity was borne of 
prejudice at face value suggests that it may be playing into the 
oppressors’ hands to celebrate such an identity.  Dr. Hubbard powerfully 
suggests as much when she discusses Nazi extermination efforts and gay 
gene studies in the same breath: 
Grounding difference in biology does not stem bigotry.  African 
Americans, Jews, people with disabilities, as well homosexuals have been 
persecuted for their biological “flaws.”  The Nazis exterminated such 
people precisely to prevent them from “contaminating” the Aryan gene 
pool.  Despite claims to the contrary, this attitude hasn’t disappeared: The 
Daily Mail of London reported on the Science article [purportedly linking 
certain DNA sequences to homosexuality] under the headline “Abortion 
Hope After ‘Gay Genes’ Findings.”33 
2. The Instability of Sexuality-Based Identity Categories 
Judith Butler has additionally argued that sexuality-based identity 
categories are inherently unstable first because they are performance-
based and therefore of uncertain continuity and second because 
heterosexual identity and homosexual identity are mutually derivative.34  
gay rights struggle” but arguing that the search for gay genes is wrongheaded because “[g]rounding 
difference in biology does not stem bigotry”). 
 33. Hubbard & Wald, supra note 11, at 83–84; see also Halley, supra note 18, at 42 (“[Q]ueer 
theory suggests that homosexual identities create a necessary condition for the oppression of 
homosexual people . . . .”); Schmeiser, supra note 17, at 1521–22 (“[T]he psychiatric turn in medico-
legal reasoning cast homosexuality as a state of diminished will and impaired self-governance. . . . 
Hence models of identity that posit sexual orientation as an innate condition outside of human agency, 
despite their apparent expediency in arguments for equality, resonate strongly with views of 
homosexuality as incompatible with self-control and therefore full democratic citizenship.” (footnote 
omitted)); accord MARK DOTY, FIREBIRD: A MEMOIR 35 (2000) (“[D]oesn’t the need to understand the 
origins of desire arise from the impetus to control it?”).  But see Schmeiser, supra note 17, at 1499 
(noting that, according to a 2007 poll, “‘Americans who believe homosexuals are born with their sexual 
orientation tend to be much more supportive of gay rights than are those who say homosexuality is due 
to upbringing and environment’” (citation omitted)). 
 34. Butler, supra note 31, at 309–13; see also Sedgwick, supra note 16, at 54 (“[E]rotic 
identity . . . can never not be relational . . . .”).  Recent scientific research on women’s sexual orientation 
supports the hypothesis that women’s sexual desires are fluid and that the sex of the objects of most 
women’s attraction naturally varies over time depending in part on situational factors (although a 
woman’s overall sexual orientation may generally remain constant).  DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 82–85.  
The results of Dr. Diamond’s empirical research appear to support Butler’s theoretical concerns, 
although, importantly, Dr. Diamond does not argue that women’s actual sexual orientations necessarily 
change over time.  Id. at 84.  Rather, she argues that most women’s sexual identities do.  Id. at 83, 87. 
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As Butler explains with respect to the performative aspect of sexuality: 
it is through the repeated play of this sexuality that the “I” is insistently 
constituted as a lesbian “I”; paradoxically, it is precisely the repetition of 
that play that establishes as well the instability of the very category that it 
constitutes. . . . [T]he I is always displaced by the very repetition that 
sustains it.35 
In other words, because of sexual orientation’s conduct-based roots, the 
continuity of one’s identity is always theoretically in question, no matter 
how consistent one’s prior sexual behavior has been as a practical 
matter, and despite the fact that a person may consistently espouse a 
given sexual orientation as a matter of personal identity.36  This aspect 
of sexual orientation suggests that it may be different in kind than other 
types of identities, such as those based on race.  Sexual orientation is 
also unstable as an identity because homosexuality and heterosexuality 
are dependent on each other for their meaning.  Thus, as Butler explains, 
“the ‘reality’ of heterosexual identities is performatively constituted 
through an imitation that sets itself up as the origin and the ground of all 
imitations”;37 however, 
if it were not for the notion of the homosexual as copy, there would be no 
construct of heterosexuality as origin. . . . In other words, the entire 
framework of copy and origin proves radically unstable as each position 
inverts into the other and confounds the possibility of any stable way to 
locate the temporal or logical priority of either term.38 
Butler thus identifies two conceptual problems with sexual orientation 
identity categories as currently constructed, both of which render the 
definitions of homosexuality and heterosexuality inherently unstable. 
Like the practical problems with the minoritizing view, these 
conceptual problems call into question the utility of preserving the 
current conception of sexual orientation as an essentialist identity 
category, especially given that instability and essentialism are 
necessarily incompatible.  The existence of these problems suggests that 
there may be something to be gained by expanding the concept of sexual 
orientation to include a wide array of sexual preferences.  Such an 
 35. Butler, supra note 31, at 311. 
 36. Id. at 310–11.  Indeed, this inherent instability appears to be one of the reasons that 
bisexuality is understood to threaten both heterosexual and homosexual identity.  See Kenji Yoshino, 
The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 362, 400 (2000). 
  Butler’s theoretical work meshes well with the emerging empirical evidence on women’s 
sexuality, which suggests that women’s sexual attractions may be much more fluid than previously 
thought.  See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing Dr. Diamond’s work). 
 37. Butler, supra note 31, at 313. 
 38. Id. 
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expansion would appear to mesh with the universalist view of sexual 
orientation, which posits the potential universality of homoerotic 
desire.39  On the other hand, however, the analyses of Butler, Foucault, 
and Hubbard do raise the more elemental question of whether any 
conception of sexual orientation would be a valuable category; in other 
words, taking their analyses to their logical conclusions perhaps 
eventually leads to dispensing with the notion of sexual orientation 
altogether.40  While eradication of the category of sexual orientation 
may (or may not) be a worthwhile goal, as further explained below, the 
goal of this Article is more modest: namely, to determine whether 
expanding sexual orientation to include other types of preferences, 
specifically polyamory, is conceptually sound and whether it should be 
pursued as a policy goal. 
III. THE OPENING UP OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION TO INCLUDE OTHER TYPES 
OF PREFERENCES 
This Part first explores the breadth of the definitions of “sexual” and 
“orientation” as a starting point for examining how narrowly sexual 
orientation has been constructed in our culture, the possible reasons for 
this narrow construction, and the problems that result from it.  This Part 
then turns to the possibilities for defining sexual orientation more 
expansively.  Finally, the possibility of expanding sexual orientation 
definitions to include polyamory is specifically explored.  Included in 
this section are analyses of the embeddedness of polyamory as an 
identity and of the level of discrimination that polyamorists face. 
A. The Breadth of the Ordinary Meanings of “Sexual” and 
“Orientation” 
As discussed above, nothing in the definition of “sexual” or 
“orientation” suggests that the term “sexual orientation” should be 
 39. Halley, supra note 18, at 48. 
 40. See, e.g., Laurie Rose Kepros, Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory, 9 
LAW & SEXUALITY 279, 283–84 (2000) (noting that queer theory “critique[s] the concept of ‘identity’ 
and the identity-based rights discourses that rely on definitional and categorical identity closure” and 
that “[q]ueer theory unfolded from the work of social constructionist Michel Foucault”); Nancy J. 
Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 140 (1998) (Queer theory 
“sees . . . categorization [as gay or heterosexual] as not simply irrelevant, but counter-productive.  The 
identity politics of gay and lesbian activism (and scholarship) reinforces what queer theory considers the 
artificial divide between the socially constructed polar extremes of sexual object choice.”); John M. 
Ohle, Note, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender People and the Law, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
237, 242 (2004) (describing Judith Butler as a principal architect of queer theory). 
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limited to identifying the sex of the people to whom one is attracted.41  
Rather, based on the ordinary meanings of its two constitutive words, 
the term “sexual orientation” should refer to any type of settled “sense of 
direction or relationship” or “choice or adjustment of associations, 
connections, or dispositions” that relates to “libidinal gratification.”42  In 
other words, just about any sexual preference would appear to be 
covered by the term as a matter of ordinary meaning, provided it was 
abiding enough to constitute a “settl[ed] sense of [personal] direction” or 
a repeatedly chosen set “of associations, connections, or dispositions.”43 
Indeed, although such an all-encompassing usage of the term is rare, 
some scholars and commentators have employed the term in this way.  
As quoted above, Dr. Hubbard has argued that “many of us have other 
strong and consistent sexual orientations–toward certain hair colors, 
body shapes, and racial types.”44  The bisexual theorist Jennifer 
Baumgardner has also used the term in an all-encompassing fashion, 
albeit without arguing explicitly for such usage.  For example, 
Baumgardner has suggested with respect to Ellen DeGeneres that 
“dating straight-looking blond starlets is, if anything, her sexual 
orientation.”45  Similarly, Baumgardner has used the synonymous term 
“sexual preference”46 just as broadly: “some lesbians date only bi 
women; you could call it a sexual preference.”47  Additionally, the 
Canadian sexuality theorist Nathan Patrick Rambukkana has described 
his own sexual orientation as a straight male in a more nuanced way 
than one ordinarily hears in common parlance: “I believe that though my 
sexual orientation is straight, my ideological and political orientation 
towards sex is queer.”48 
These usages suggest that a person’s sexual orientation may, in actual 
 41. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (quoting dictionary definitions of “sexual” and 
“orientation”). 
 42. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2002), available 
at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/unabridged?va=orientation (defining “orientation” as 
“the settling of a sense of direction or relationship in moral or social concerns or in thought or art” or 
“choice or adjustment of associations, connections, or dispositions”); id., available at 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/unabridged?va=sexual (defining “sexual” as “of or 
relating to the sphere of behavior associated with libidinal gratification”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Hubbard & Wald, supra note 11, at 83; see also Glazer, supra note 21 (manuscript at 40) 
(“Currently, sexual orientation is understood along a variety of axes – gender is of course the most 
obvious, but others include age, species, fetish, power, and number.”). 
 45. BAUMGARDNER, supra note 11, at 216. 
 46. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2006), available at 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/medical?book=Medical&va=sexual%20preference 
(defining “sexual preference” as “sexual orientation”). 
 47. BAUMGARDNER, supra note 11, at 195–96. 
 48. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 151. 
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application, be both broader and narrower than the common use of the 
term.  Hubbard’s use, for example, would encompass any “strong and 
consistent” sexual preference, so it is broader in application than just the 
sex of the objects of one’s attraction.  By contrast, Baumgardner’s usage 
suggests that one’s orientation may be narrower than the typical use of 
the term; one may be attracted to not just women for example, but only 
to “bi women,” or, even more specifically, to “straight-looking blond 
starlets.”  Rambukkana’s statement calls to mind not just a very specific 
orientation but also one with theoretical subtleties beyond what many 
would probably consider as a possibility. 
Both Hubbard’s and Baumgardner’s uses appear to comport with 
common sense.  With respect to Baumgardner’s usage, the person who 
was attracted to all women or to all men or to everyone regardless of sex 
would appear to be the exception rather than the rule, although this fact 
is arguably obscured—or at least devalued—by the common usage of 
the term “sexual orientation.”  Similarly, addressing Hubbard’s usage, 
people do commonly speak of having a “type” of person they are 
attracted to, the significance of which tends to include physical 
characteristics and personality traits; these characteristics and traits 
could easily be conceived of as aspects of one’s sexual orientation.49 
Rambukkana’s statement suggests that there may be facets to the 
notion of sexual orientation that are largely unexplored by the general 
populace.  His description of his own sexual orientation also implies the 
need for self-definition—indeed the identification of such subtleties 
suggests that sexual orientation may be such a personal, value-laden 
concept that society would be best-served by each person’s being free to 
define her own.50  The notion that individuals should be able to define 
their own sexual orientations is supported by recent empirical research 
on women’s sexual identities.51  In this sense, sexual orientation may be 
more analogous to religion than race in that the individual has the 
ultimate right to define or name that aspect of him or herself. 
 49. Accord Glazer, supra note 21 (manuscript at 36–40) (explaining that society commonly 
accepts the phenomenon of individuals’ being attracted to those who are not their traditional types 
except when the deviant characteristic is gender). 
 50. See, e.g., Ann Tweedy, Subverting Normalcy: Living a Femme Identity, in 1 VISIBLE: A 
FEMMETHOLOGY 69 (Jennifer Clare Burke ed., 2009) (arguing for the right to self-definition of one’s 
sexual orientation). 
 51. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 87 (“Instead of assuming that sexual identities represent enduring 
sexual ‘truths,’ it may be more productive to think of identity as ‘the choice of a particular perspective 
from which to make sense of one’s sexual feelings and behavior.’” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 50 
(“Women are also more likely than men to report sexual behaviors or attractions that are inconsistent 
with their identity . . . .”). 
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B. Reasons to Consider Expanding the Definition in a Piecemeal 
Fashion 
The facts that the current usage of the term “sexual orientation” is 
artificially limited and that it poses problems for those whom it is most 
often invoked to describe,52 however, do not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that, as a matter of anti-discrimination law, the definition 
should be opened up to include any and all sexual preferences that are 
either sufficiently strong and consistent53 or sufficiently settled to 
technically qualify as a sexual orientation.54  Rather, it could well be 
argued that only those sexual preferences that are likely to be the basis 
for discrimination should be protected by anti-discrimination law.55 
For example, one’s orientation may include being attracted to 
blondes, as Baumgardner’s comments suggest.  The costs of protecting 
people from workplace discrimination based on their attraction to 
blondes, however, may well outweigh the limited benefits.  First, 
because this is not a common basis of discrimination, the rare person 
who was discriminated against because of such a preference could 
presumably find another job relatively easily.  Additionally, given the 
rarity of this type of discrimination (assuming it exists at all), it would 
be difficult to argue that the person who suffered it had suffered an 
egregious societal harm that was any deeper than that suffered by 
anyone else who was fired for an arbitrary but legal reason, such as not 
being outgoing enough for the boss’s taste or being a fan of a particular 
sports team.56  Finally, it is possible to argue that, given that an 
employee may generally be fired for any reason except membership in a 
suspect class, it may not make sense to alter that rule solely in the 
context of sexual preferences while leaving it in place for other 
 52. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 5, at 18, 21 (noting that “[o]ur schema [or set of beliefs] for 
‘sexual orientation’ typically includes lesbians, gays, and bisexuals,” that “we often forget that 
heterosexuals also have a sexual orientation,” and that “we do not have a separate schema for 
heterosexuals; they are just ‘people’ and not a group characterized by their sexual behavior”). 
 53. Hubbard & Wald, supra note 11, at 83. 
 54. See supra note 10. 
 55. This view reflects a class-based, as opposed to a classification-based, approach to anti-
discrimination law.  See Yoshino, supra note 24, at 563 (distinguishing between the two approaches). 
 56. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 676–77 
(2001) (distinguishing between an employer’s permissible irrationality, such as making employment 
decisions based on hair color, from impermissible irrationality, such as requiring employees to have 
accepted Jesus Christ to be promoted); cf. COOPER, supra note 16, at 63–66 (arguing that it may not 
make sense to treat smokers as a protected class because “[t]here is no evidence that smoking, as the 
enactment and reproduction of socially asymmetrical positions, affects institutional forms such as 
education, local government, the military, or the law[, and i]t also does not render modes of power 
intelligible,” and further that smoking “fails to attain the status of an organising principle of inequality” 
because its relationship to social dynamics is a very mediated one). 
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employment decisions, especially in light of the fact that litigation 
expenses for each newly protected type of sexual preference could be 
cumulatively significant.  On the other hand, however, it is equally 
possible to argue that one’s sexual preferences, and the ability to act on 
or otherwise express them without facing adverse consequences, should 
be considered a core personal freedom that warrants statutory or even 
constitutional protection.57 
Additionally, the requirement in some anti-discrimination statutes of 
identification or perceived identification with a certain sexual 
orientation58 may indicate that, as a society, we should consider 
including a person’s self-identification, along with perceived orientation, 
as part of any legal definition of sexual orientation.  This idea finds 
support in Rambukkana’s admonition that “those [polyamorists who] 
can afford to have the label ‘polyamorous’ linked to [their] identities 
have a responsibility” to self-identify in order “to help guide the 
uncertain future of non-monogamy,” in his suggestion that such self-
identification will likely pave the way for closeted others both to 
understand and accept themselves and eventually to self–identify,59 and 
in his very nuanced description of his own sexual orientation.  Indeed, a 
person who was entirely closeted about his or her sexual desires, 
manifesting or professing only those that were considered completely 
normal or mainstream and who could otherwise blend in, in terms of 
sexual orientation, with mainstream society would have no need for anti-
discrimination protections based on sexual orientation.  Such a person 
could be viewed as having acceded to the demands of the mainstream 
hetero- and mono-normative society either to avoid the prospect of 
discrimination or, perhaps, in some cases, to appease his or her own 
internalized negative feelings about his or her sexual orientation.  Thus, 
it would appear to be the person who either self-identified with a 
societally disfavored sexual preference or who was involuntarily 
identified by others as exhibiting such a preference who would most 
need the protections of an anti-discrimination law.  By engaging in the 
political act of expressing her identity,60 such a person makes herself 
 57. See, e.g., Moshe Landman, Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: I. 
Constitutional Chapter: Sexual Privacy After Lawrence: Co-habitation, Sodomy, and Adultery, 6 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 379, 388–89 (2005) (describing proposals to expand Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), to make sexual privacy a fundamental constitutional right or, alternatively, to create a 
fundamental right to engage in consensual sex that would be based on either substantive due process or 
the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
 58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (citing Connecticut’s, Iowa’s, and Maryland’s 
statutes). 
 59. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 152. 
 60. See Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 
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uniquely vulnerable to discrimination61 (or is made so in the case of 
involuntary identification).  On the other hand, given that closeted 
homosexuality and other closeted sexual preferences cause significant 
harm to those who closet themselves,62 closeted persons also warrant 
consideration.  While they may not be able to directly benefit from anti-
discrimination protections while remaining closeted, it is conceivable 
that the existence of anti-discrimination protections could lead them, at 
least in part, to come out of the closet regarding disfavored preferences 
and thus to avoid the continued harms of the closet. 
Leaving these questions aside, a more difficult problem is posed by 
sexual orientations, such as pedophilia,63 that are societally disfavored 
because they cause harm to others and to society at large.64  Similarly, 
harmful sexual practices, such as parent–child incest, may or may not 
rise to the level of consistency and strength that are arguably required 
for sexual orientations.  Presumably in neither case would we want to 
prohibit employers from making negative employment decisions based 
on such preferences or practices.65  Thus, a holistic definition of “sexual 
orientation” in an anti-discrimination statute would, in some principled 
way, have to exclude harmful sexual preferences while protecting those 
that are societally disfavored simply because of prejudice.  Moreover, 
because unconventional sexual preferences are likely to be erroneously 
viewed as harmful by society at large, making such a distinction would 
almost certainly prove a difficult task. 
Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly many sexual preferences that are 
societally disfavored, on which adverse employment decisions are 
frequently based, but which do not appear to cause societal harm.  Given 
the potential difficulty of arriving at an overarching principle by which 
to distinguish genuinely harmful sexual preferences from those that are 
1979) (recognizing out homosexuality as, in part, a political activity), superseded by statute as stated in 
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 61. See, e.g., Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 149. 
 62. Yoshino, supra note 24, at 527, 549.  See also JULIANA SPAHR, THE TRANSFORMATION 176–
79 (2007) (describing the author’s personal experiences of self-hatred, pain, and fear related to the 
closeting of her polyamorous relationship). 
 63. Pedophilia is an attraction to children as sex objects.  While this predilection is often 
erroneously imputed to gay males, in fact, pedophilia appears to be rarely, if ever, perpetrated by men 
who identify as homosexual.  See Richard R. Bradley, Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill: A Law and 
Economics Defense of Same-Sex Foster Care Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 133, 140–41 (2007). 
 64. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 16, at 4 (acknowledging the difficulty that socially harmful 
identities and choices pose for equality advocates). 
 65. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the 
Workplace, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE 
CONVERSATIONS 153, 153–54 (Martha Albertson Finemen et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that incest taboos 
are useful for society and that similar taboos should be developed to govern supervisor–subordinate 
relationships in the workplace). 
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disfavored because of prejudice, it may be more feasible to expand the 
definition of “sexual orientation” in a piecemeal way to include at least 
some of these preferences within the realm of anti-discrimination 
statutes.  Some of the more promising possibilities include preferences 
for partners of other races, preferences for transgender partners, 
preferences for polyamorous relationships, and preferences for 
sadomasochistic relationships.66  What follows is an exploration of 
including the preference for polyamorous relationships within the 
definition of sexual orientation. 
C. Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation 
This subsection briefly introduces polyamory and then examines: (1) 
the embeddedness of polyamory as an identity; (2) the levels of 
discrimination that polyamorists face; and (3) the potential 
complications of redefining sexual orientation to include polyamory. 
1. Introduction to Polyamory 
Polyamory, which is commonly shortened to “poly,” “in general 
describes the practice, state or ability of having more than one sexual 
[or, for some, romantic] loving relationships at the same time, with the 
full knowledge and consent of all partners involved.”67  Thus, 
polyamory, which literally means having more than one lover, is 
relationship-based and should be distinguished from more casual types 
of non-monogamy such as swinging.68  It “is a lifestyle embraced by a 
 66. See, e.g., Erica Chito Childs, Listening to the Interracial Canary: Contemporary Views on 
Interracial Relationships Among Blacks and Whites, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2771, 2785 (2008) 
(discussing prejudice against interracial relationships among both black and white communities); see 
generally Jason Simms, Bound and Flagged: Members of Seattle’s Kink Community Face 
Discrimination in Custody Battles, STRANGER, Feb. 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/Content?oid=162102 (documenting discrimination against those 
who prefer sadomasochistic relationships including workplace discrimination and discrimination against 
such parents in child custody disputes). 
 67. Hadar Aviram, Make Love, Not Law: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Struggle Among 
Polyamorous Activists, 7 J. BISEXUALITY 261, 264 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alteration in original); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed., 
2005), available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/collegiate?va=polyamory (defining 
“polyamory” as “the state or practice of having more than one open romantic relationship at a time”). 
 68. See, e.g., Anne Bokma, Polyamory: Inside an open marriage, MORE MAGAZINE, Apr. 2010, 
available at http://www.more.ca/relationships/married-life/polyamory-inside-an-open-marriage/a/ 
29927/print (stating that “[p]olyamory is not swinging, swapping or an orgiastic free-for-all” and that it 
“involves negotiating agreements, processing emotions with multiple lovers, and honest 
communication” (internal quotation marks omitted)); “Why can’t you love more than one partner?,” 
INDEP. ON SUNDAY (London), Sept. 13, 2009, at 20 (noting that polyamory is not “swinging or adultery” 
and that polys want “ongoing, honest, committed relationships”); Valerie Reiss, Getting Over 
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minority of individuals who exhibit a wide variety of relationship 
models and who articulate an ethical vision that . . . encompass[es] five 
main principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-
possession, and privileging love and sex over other emotions and 
activities such as jealousy.”69  As suggested by these principles, 
polyamory is not only “a practice,” but is also, at least for some of its 
adherents, “a theory of relationships.”70  As a theory, polyamory “has a 
decidedly feminist bent,”71 building “in part on a feminist understanding 
of monogamy as a historical mechanism for the control of women’s 
reproductive and other labor.”72 
It is estimated that there are more than half a million “openly 
polyamorous families in the United States . . . with thriving contingents 
in nearly every major city.”73  In addition to the prevalence of 
polyamorists in the United States, polyamory has also received 
increasing attention in other countries, including Great Britain, Canada, 
and New Zealand.74 
Additionally, polyamory is often perceived to be linked to 
bisexuality,75 although straight and homosexual persons also practice 
polyamory76 and bisexuals may be polyamorous or monogamous.77  
Monogamy: Those Disenchanted With One-On-One Relationships are Finding a Way to Multiply, 
Share, and Sustain Love, BREATHE, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 51–52 (“Unlike swinging or cheating, polyamory 
focuses on love first and sex second . . . .”); Alicia Potter, Free Love Grows Up: Free Love Might Sound 
Like a Euphemism for Group Sex, but to Boston’s Polyamory Community, it’s Just Like Marriage—Only 
Bigger, BOSTON PHOENIX, Oct. 15, 1998, available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/ 
features/98/10/15/polyamorists.html (“‘I don’t consider [swinging] polyamory, because it doesn’t focus 
on the relationship.’” (quoting author Deborah M. Anapol)). 
 69. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283 (2004). 
 70. Id. at 320. 
 71. Jessica Bennett, Only You. And You. And You.: Polyamory—Relationships with Multiple, 
Mutually Consenting Partners—Has a Coming-Out Party, NEWSWEEK, July 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/209164. 
 72. Emens, supra note 69, at 325. 
 73. Bennett, supra note 71. 
 74. See, e.g., Nikki Watkins, Jessica Bateman, I Kiss My Man Goodnight, Shut the Door . . . and 
Sleep with My Other Lover; Julianne’s Life with Two Partners, SUN (London), Feb. 24, 2010, at 44; 
Zosia Bielski, Love and Mixed Doubles; An Open Marriage has its Own Rules of Play, NAT’L POST 
(Ontario), Sept. 20, 2008, at WP.3; Emily Watt, When One Lover is not Enough, DOMINION POST 
(Wellington), Mar. 15, 2008, at A.10. 
 75. See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 67, at 265; Elisabeth Sheff, Polyamorous Women, Sexual 
Subjectivity and Power, 34 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 251, 268 (2005). 
 76. See, e.g., Adam Weber, Survey Results: Who Are We? and Other Interesting Impressions, 
LOVING MORE MAGAZINE, Summer 2007, at 4; Aviram, supra note 67, at 267; Rambukkana, supra note 
16, at 145, 149; see also Geri Weitzman, Therapy with Clients Who Are Bisexual and Polyamorous, 
in AFFIRMATIVE PSYCHOTHEREAPY WITH BISEXUAL WOMEN AND BISEXUAL MEN 137, 141–42 (Ronald 
C. Fox ed., 2006) (citing studies documenting rates of lesbians, gay men, and heterosexuals engaging in 
polyamory or non-monogamy). 
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Finally, some polyamorists see themselves as “hardwired” that way,78 
while others do not necessarily see polyamory as an identity or, 
alternatively, see it as a constructed identity.79 
Before moving on, the question of whether polyamory includes 
polygamy should be addressed.  This question has repeatedly been 
raised during my presentations of this material.  To the extent 
polygamists ascribe to the basic definition of polyamory,80 adhere to the 
values associated with polyamory, and identify themselves as 
polyamorists, they fall within the scope of polyamory.  Conversely, if a 
polygamist did not ascribe to the basic definition of polyamory (for 
example, if he or she married two spouses but attempted to keep the 
multiplicity of marriages secret from each spouse or married underage 
persons who could not legally consent), he or she would clearly not fall 
within the definition of polyamory.  There are, however, certainly cases 
between these two extremes for which there is no easy answer.81 
 77. Weitzman, supra note 76, at 141 (discussing a study in which thirty-three percent of bisexual 
respondents reported being in polyamorous relationships, and fifty-four percent reported that polyamory 
represented their ideal form of relationship). 
 78. Emens, supra note 69, at 304, 321, 351; see also Sheff, supra note 75, at 274 (describing one 
of the interviewees in her research as “identif[ying] as polyamorous since she was fourteen”). 
 79. Emens, supra note 69, at 321, 351.  See also Aviram, supra note 67, at 271 (“The liberal 
argument, according to which gay people are ‘born gay’ and therefore do not have the choice to marry 
someone from the other sex, seems, to some poly activists, problematic . . . . Regardless of whether they 
believe they are genetically ‘wired poly’, or whether they chose their lifestyle, they argue that, if their 
relationships are to be recognized, it is not because they have been born ‘different’ or ‘defective.’”); id. 
(“Polyamorist activists lean toward a framework that rejects identity politics and strives to go beyond 
it.”); Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 147–48 (noting that, “[w]hile most people do [non-monogamy] . . . 
sometime in their lives . . . few people want it linked to their identity” and tying this fact to societal 
prejudice as well as potentially “serious social and legal consequences”).  The documentary film Three 
of Hearts: A Postmodern Family provides an example of three people who participated in a thirteen-year 
polyamorous relationship together but do not consider themselves to have a polyamorous identity.  
THREE OF HEARTS: A POSTMODERN FAMILY (THINKfilm 2005).  At the end of the film, the female 
member of the relationship, which had since dissolved, characterized herself as having been engaged in 
a protracted period of “experiment[ation],” while the two males seemed to suggest that they were 
naturally monogamous with other males.  Id.  That being said, immediately after the break-up of an 
unconventional relationship may not be the best time to question people about their commitment to the 
lifestyle that the relationship embodied. 
 80. The basic definition of “polyamory” is the practice, state, or ability of having more than one 
sexual loving relationship with the full knowledge and consent of all parties involved. 
 81. For example, Elizabeth Emens describes a Mormon woman who is one of her husband’s 
multiple wives and who finds the multi-party relationship empowering, although none of the participants 
call the relationship polyamorous.  Emens, supra note 69, at 307.  This is a difficult case.  My own view 
is that a person who would not accept the label of polyamorous should probably not be defined as such.  
However, if it were revealed that the woman Emens describes largely espoused the principles associated 
with polyamory and identified as something like polyamorous (without naming it as such), it would 
seem that she could be argued to fall within the definition of polyamorous at least for some purposes.  
Moreover, as a practical matter, in the context of antidiscrimination statutes, it may be most feasible to 
utilize the basic definition of “polyamory,” without regard to the values associated with it.  This would 
avoid thorny problems associated with courts’ having to examine plaintiffs’ values and with the 
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2. Is Polyamory Deep-Seated Enough to Be Considered a Sexual 
Orientation? 
This subsection examines the extent to which an identity category 
may be embedded or, in other words, integral to an individual’s personal 
identity.  After examining this concept generally, this Article examines 
how embedded polyamory appears to be in the lives of the individuals 
who practice it.  The purpose of this subsection is to determine whether 
it makes sense to consider polyamory to be a sexual orientation on the 
theory that the more embedded a way of being is the more sense it 
makes to consider it an identity and specifically a sexual orientation. 
a. The Continuum of Embededness for Various Types of Identities 
In order to analyze this issue, this Article posits a scale ranging from 
most embedded to least embedded.  An essential identity, assuming such 
identities exist, would represent the most embedded extreme, with a 
constructed identity that was “so constraining and powerful that 
individuals . . . live[d] their assignment to one [identity] classification 
rather than another as wholly unchosen and unchangeable”82 being the 
next, or close to the next,83 most embedded identity.  The other extreme 
of casual or superficial classifications would be represented by 
designations that individuals experienced as wholly extraneous to their 
identities.  For example, someone may take the bus to work for a brief 
period out of sheer necessity but may not see this activity as representing 
anything significant about him- or herself, while another person could 
take the bus regularly as an expression of deep-seated environmentalism.  
In the first case, the bus-taking would be at the far extreme of casual or 
superficial identity, while, in the second, the same activity would fall 
somewhere in the middle between the two poles because, in the second 
case, being a bus-taker would likely be a designation that the individual 
associated herself with and was proud of.  Presumably, the more 
embedded an identity was, the more likely it would be to manifest as 
strong and consistent (as Dr. Hubbard suggested would be required for a 
appearance of state sponsorship of specific values. 
  Emens also makes the important point that perceptions of polygamist, specifically 
polygynist, relationships among Mormons and Muslims as sexist appears to drive much of the prejudice 
against polyamory in this country.  Id. at 301–03. 
 82. Marcosson, supra note 56, at 682. 
 83. An identity that was comprised of a combination of both physical-biological and socio-
cultural factors would probably be the next most embedded identity, after an essential identity, see, for 
example, DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 22, but such an identity would be very close, in terms of 
embeddedness, to the powerfully socially constructed identity described above. 
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sexual orientation) or settled and repeated (the requirements implied by 
the dictionary definitions of “orientation”).  A predilection for 
polyamorous relationships could fall at various points along this 
continuum.  Thus, it is necessary to examine just how deeply embedded 
polyamory appears to be based on the available evidence. 
b. How Deeply Embedded is Polyamory? 
i. Summary of Views of Whether Polyamory Is an Identity from Within 
the Polyamorous Community 
Polyamorists express differing views about whether polyamory 
should be considered an identity, and those that think it is an identity 
express differing views regarding whether it is a “hardwired” or 
constructed identity.84  Moreover, some evidence suggests that many 
polyamorists are resistant to the idea that polyamory is an essential 
identity, instead preferring to focus on the “freedom, fluidity, and 
individualism” afforded by membership in the polyamorous 
community.85  It is impossible, however, to make generalizations 
because some polyamorists do view polyamory as an essential 
identity,86 sometimes linking the highest degree of individual 
polyamorous tendencies to “a hardwired absence of 87
This diversity of views about polyamorous identity among those who 
practice it is reminiscent of the diversity of views on LGB identity that 
exists within that community.88  It appears from the limited research 
available on polyamory, however, that the essentialist view of 
polyamory is considerably less popular in polyamorist circles than is the 
essentialist view of homosexuality in LGB circles, and that, within each 
 84. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (discussing the statements of polyamorists 
regarding their poly identities). 
 85. Aviram, supra note 67, at 272–73, 281; accord Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 146 (“[T]here 
are as many styles of polyamory as there are polyamorists.”).  Aviram’s research was limited to the San 
Francisco Bay Area’s polyamory community and so may not be reflective of polyamorists generally.  
See id. at 264. 
  While the values of freedom, fluidity, and individualism could themselves conceivably 
comprise an identity, an identity based on them would be almost the opposite of a traditional essentialist 
identity, which tends to be based on a conception of shared traits that are both static and monolithic.  By 
contrast, an identity based on freedom, fluidity, and individualism would likely functionally result in a 
high degree of actual diversity among group members; thus, it would constitute a kind of anti-identity, 
although arguably an identity nonetheless. 
 86. Emens, supra note 69, at 349–52. 
 87. Id. at 351. 
 88. See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 56, at 708, 710; see also Halley, supra note 18, at 42 
(describing queer theory’s critique of the notion of homosexual identity); id. at 48–49 (distinguishing 
between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homosexuality). 
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community respectively, universalizing language about polyamory tends 
to be much more common than does similar language about 
homosexuality.89 
ii. Summary of Outsider Views of Polyamory 
Outside of polyamorous communities, polyamory is rarely thought of 
as an identity, let alone as either an essential or immutable one.90  For 
example, Jonathan Rauch has argued that “no serious person claims 
there are people constituitively attracted only to . . . groups rather than 
individuals. . . . People who insist on marrying . . . several lovers want 
an additional (and weird) marital option. . . . A demand for 
polygamous . . . marriage is thus frivolous in a way that the demand for 
gay marriage is not.”91  Thus, in accord with Rauch’s comments, 
polyamory identity is commonly thought of as “so superficial as to be 
frivolous” and “polys are generally not seen as a discrete group of 
individuals.”92 
iii. Evidence Suggests that Polyamory Is at Least Moderately Embedded 
These outsider views of polyamory may partially reflect prejudice 
against polyamorous people (in which case the views themselves would 
support the need for anti-discrimination laws to protect polyamorous 
people) or they may be, at least to some degree, a defensive reaction 
borne partially out of fears that a struggle for poly rights will reduce the 
chances for success of LGB struggles.  At any rate, five sources of 
evidence suggest that, regardless of whether polyamory is typically 
understood as an essential identity, it is at least somewhere near the 
middle of the scale described above and that it may be closer to the most 
 89. See Emens, supra note 69, at 343–46 (discussing the prevalence of universalizing language 
in polyamorous discourse); see also id. at 342 (“I would . . . posit that the contemporary view of 
homosexuality is highly minoritizing relative to the general view of polyamory.”). 
 90. Id. at 342. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; Hadar Aviram, Geeks, Goddesses, and Green Eggs: Political Mobilization and the 
Cultural Locus of the Polyamorous Community in the San Francisco Bay Area, in UNDERSTANDING 
NON-MONOGAMIES 87 (Meg Barker & Darren Langdridge eds., 2009); see generally William Saletan, 
Don’t Do Unto Others: The Difference Between Gay Marriage and Polygamy, SLATE, Mar. 26, 2006, 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2138482; see also Lee Stranahan, Why Are Gay Marriage 
Advocates Not Defending Polyamory?, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-stranahan/why-are-gay-marriage-advo_b_155476.html?view=screen 
(arguing that, as a matter of logic, same-sex marriage advocates should also support polyamorous 
marriages and expressing confusion that there is not greater support among such advocates); Bennett, 
supra note 71 (relating the popular view that “polyamory is a choice; homosexuality is not”). 
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embedded pole.  These sources of evidence include: (1) the statements 
of some polyamorists regarding their identities; (2) the value system that 
polyamory embodies; (3) the risks that polyamorous people take to 
engage in that lifestyle; (4) the importance placed on romantic 
relationships in American culture and the extent to which individual 
identity tends to flow from such relationships; and (5) legal and 
psychological research suggesting that polyamory has important 
parallels with homosexuality.  On the other hand, the nearly universal 
character of non-mongamous desire93 compared with the much smaller 
subset of people who act on it polyamorously may suggest that at least 
the desire aspect of polyamory is not unique, a fact which may make it 
harder for polyamorists to convincingly describe themselves as a unique 
group, at least one based on polyamorous desires.  This apparent 
universality of non-monogamous desires may also make it difficult for 
polyamorists to claim the most entrenched form of a constructed 
identity, under which the individual experiences his or her identity 
classification as unchosen and unchangeable, although some 
polyamorists do experience their identities in that way. 
First, as noted above, some polyamorists describe themselves as 
having been poly since early adolescence or even earlier and make other 
essentialist-sounding statements about their identities such as 
“[m]onogamy is just not my nature.”94  The legal scholar Elizabeth 
Emens has characterized such discourse as a “minoritizing strand in 
contemporary writings”95 on polyamory, thus suggesting that the 
minoritizing way of looking at polyamory is not the norm within the 
community.  Other evidence, which is limited in geographical scope, 
appears to confirm this view,96 although a very significant minority 
(thirty-six percent) of polyamorous bisexuals in one study reported that 
they had never preferred monogamy at any point in their lives.97 
For at least the subset of polyamorists described above, then, there is 
 93. Emens, supra note 69, at 345. 
 94. Id. at 350; see also Sheff, supra note 75, at 274; accord Weitzman, supra note 76, at 144 
(describing a previous study in which, of 2,169 bisexual and polyamorous respondents, thirty-six percent 
reported “that they had never preferred monogamy at any point in their lives”). 
  Early adolescence is also a time period in which many homosexuals first feel same-sex 
attraction.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. at *7, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“[C]ore feelings and attractions that form the basis for adult sexual 
orientation typically emerge between middle childhood and early adolescence.”). 
 95. Emens, supra note 69, at 349–50 (emphasis added). 
 96. See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 67, at 264 (noting that author’s research focuses on San 
Francisco Bay Area polyamorists); id. at 271–72 (discussing the fact that San Francisco Bay Area 
“[p]olyamorous activists lean toward a framework that rejects identity politics and strives to go beyond 
it”). 
 97. Weitzman, supra note 76, at 144. 
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support for placing their poly identities on the most embedded end of the 
scale.  Their experiences of understanding, from an early age, that they 
wanted types of relationships that differed from the societal norm are at 
least somewhat reminiscent of the classic homosexual experience of 
growing up knowing that one lacks the societally-prescribed interest in 
the opposite sex, although arguably wanting multiple relationships rather 
than one is less radical than wanting a relationship with someone of the 
same sex. 
Additionally, some poly activists, such as Rambukkana, have 
described polyamory as an identity, although not necessarily an 
essentialist one.98  He understands polyamory, like bisexuality, to 
occupy a “liminial position.”99  In the case of polyamory, that liminal 
position is one “caught between underground radicalism and public 
discourse” as well as between “queer and straight discourses of desire” 
and “forms of relationship.”100  For Rambukkana, polyamory is part of 
his identity as “a sex radical,” and he considers his “ideological and 
political orientation towards sex” to be queer.101  However, though he 
believes, through his polyamory, he is “queering the concept of love or 
partnership,” at the same time he does not view this as enough to make 
him “queer,” a label he sees as reserved for homosexual desire.102  
Rambukkana notes that his practice of polyamory is shaped by the 
experiences he had once he and his partner decided to have an open 
relationship.103  He also describes polyamory as “a form[] of sexuality,” 
advocates that those polyamorists “who can afford to have the label 
‘polyamorous’ linked to [their] identities” do so, and, finally, states that, 
“[a]s a straight, out polyamorist, [he is] exercising [his] existential right 
to self-name and forge a subject position for [himself] and for those 
 98. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 151.  See also Reiss, supra note 68, at 51–52 (describing and 
quoting interviews with participants at New York City’s Poly Pride Day).  The very existence of a Poly 
Pride Day tends to suggest a view of polyamory as an identity.  See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 16, at 47. 
 99. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 151; see also Emens, supra note 69, at 343, 346 (drawing 
comparisons between societal prejudice towards polyamory and that towards bisexuality). 
 100. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 151. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  Rambukkana’s definition of “queer” would be challenged by some queer theorists, who 
see “queer” as a much broader term.  See, e.g., Adam P. Romero, Methodological Descriptions: 
“Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE 
ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 179, 192 (Martha Albertson Finemen et al. eds., 
2009) (“Queer . . . positions in opposition to, or at least at odds with, that which is normal, dominant, or 
hegemonic, but there is nothing to which ‘queer’ necessarily refers . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 193 
(“To define queer legal theory in terms of sexual orientation, the interests of sexual minorities, or, most 
broadly, sexuality, will . . . prove short sighted.”). 
 103. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 146. 
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like” him.104 
Although Rambukkana does not explicitly label polyamory as a 
constructed identity, his descriptions seem to indicate that 
understanding.  He speaks of the difficulty of polyamory’s liminal 
position, noting that this position is at least part of what makes 
polyamory a “particularly difficult social mantle[] to take on”105 and 
describes the alienation one risks in “com[ing] out of the poly closet.”106  
This language suggests that avowing polyamory, like other disfavored 
identities, can have oppressive social consequences, which are 
presumably constructed but entrenched in society.  An important 
ramification of such consequences, to be explored further below, is that 
they are likely to discourage people from espousing polyamory in a 
superficial or haphazard way—the costs can be expected to be too great.  
Thus, such consequences indirectly suggest that polyamory would not be 
at the superficial or extraneous extreme of the embeddedness scale.  
Moreover, the terminology of the closet draws an implicit comparison 
between polyamory and homosexuality,107 and Rambukkana also 
explicitly compares polyamory to bisexuality; these comparisons evoke 
an identity that, like homosexuality and bisexuality, appears to be 
considerably embedded.  Further, Rambukkana’s use of the language 
“caught between” with reference to polyamory’s “liminal position” 
suggests some of the lack of choice and constraint that are tied to the 
type of constructed identity that would come next after an essential 
identity on the embeddedness scale.  His use of the language 
“ideological and political orientation” also suggests a potentially deep-
seated constructed identity but, this time, one with elements of personal 
choice.  While his statement that his experiences influenced his practice 
of polyamory, on first blush, may suggest a less embedded identity, in 
fact it would be hard to argue that any individual’s experiences did not 
influence her practice of heterosexuality or homosexuality.  Thus, this 
statement probably does not indicate a lack of embeddedness of poly 
identity.  Finally, his description of polyamory as a sexuality and his 
linkage between avowing polyamory and exercising his right to self-
name and to form a subject position suggest that polyamory is a deep 
and integral part of his identity and therefore that it is more towards the 
embedded end of the scale. 
 104. See id. at 152. 
 105. Id. at 144. 
 106. Id. at 149. 
 107. Additionally, psychotherapist Geri Weitzman has discussed the phenomenon of coming out 
as polyamorous to oneself and has explicitly compared this experience to that of LGB people in coming 
out of the closet.  Weitzman, supra note 76, at 148. 
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Thus, the essentialist-sounding statements of polyamorists quoted 
above and Rambukkana’s descriptions of his own poly identity support 
placing polyamory, in the first case, at the most embedded end of the 
scale and, in the second, somewhere between the most embedded end 
and the middle.  Although these views may not be representative of the 
poly community as a whole, they demonstrate, at least with respect to 
the individuals involved, that poly identity is far from frivolous or 
superficial.  Importantly, the fact that there is diversity among 
polyamorists about how they view their own practice of polyamory, 
whether they conceive of it as an identity, and, if so, what type of 
identity, does not necessarily detract from the validity of the points of 
view of those who do view poly as an identity.108  A similar diversity 
exists within the LGB community,109 and some scholars have suggested 
that it should be viewed as a strength rather than a weakness.110 
Secondly, the values associated with polyamory also suggest that it is 
not a superficial or extraneous identity.  Emens has identified five 
principles that are encompassed within the “ethical vision” of 
polyamory: “self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, 
and privileging love and sex over other emotions such as jealousy.”111  
Other scholars, such as Hadar Aviram, have linked polyamory to “a 
utopian, visionary background,”112 and to values such as originality, 
individualism, tolerance, freedom, fluidity, and pluralism.113  Under 
these scholars’ views, it is apparent that polyamory is at least partially 
about embracing a worldview that has specific cultural roots in “the 
utopian Oneida commune of upstate New York,” which was founded in 
1848,114 as well as in science fiction and fantasy literature, especially the 
works of the author Robert Heinlein.115  The values encompassed in this 
vision, which are apparently at least partially socially constructed, are 
likely to be deep-seated.116  For example, most people could with some 
 108. See Tweedy, supra note 50, at 69 (arguing that each person has a right to define her own 
identity in the context of sexual orientation and other attributes). 
 109. See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 56, at 708, 710. 
 110. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 69, at 353. 
 111. Id. at 283. 
 112. Aviram, supra note 67, at 277. 
 113. Id. at 273, 281.  See also Weitzman, supra note 76, at 147 (noting based on survey results 
that “within the bi-poly [bisexual-poly] community there is a higher degree of acceptance for people’s 
differences than there is within the mainstream”). 
 114. Bennett, supra note 71; Emens, supra note 69, at 303 n.127.  But see Rambukkana, supra 
note 16, at 146 (“In reality, rather than an unbroken line from one group of sex radicals to the next, the 
acculturation of individuals into certain ways of being can be (and usually is) much more eclectic.”). 
 115. Aviram, supra note 67, at 275. 
 116. See, e.g., Jesse Graham et al., Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral 
Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1031 (2009) (arguing that moral foundations, 
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consistency over time, be described as honest, dishonest, or some 
variation thereof, such as honest except in certain, identifiable 
circumstances.  Similarly, the values of pluralism, tolerance, 
individualism, and originality, as well as pursuit of self-knowledge 
appear to generally be present in a person or not.  While experiences 
could potentially lead a person to become more or less tolerant, for 
instance, or more or less inclined to pursue self-knowledge, one would 
expect these values to change in an individual, if at all, gradually over 
time.  It is difficult to imagine the opposite occurring—waking up one 
morning and saying, “despite my conflicting values up until now, for the 
next month, I am going to be honest with everyone with whom I enter a 
relationship, will embrace tolerance, self-knowledge, and self-
possession, will privilege love over jealousy, and will pursue more than 
one relationship simultaneously.”  If polyamory were entirely 
superficial, as some have argued, then such a sudden change could 
easily occur and would not require a major life-changing event to spur it 
on.  Instead, the opposite appears to be true.  A person could not 
embrace polyamory without either having had a consonant set of values 
already in place for some time or having come gradually to espouse 
them.  The importance of such values to polyamory, and the relative 
difficulty of changing one’s value system, suggest that polyamory must 
be at least somewhere around the middle of the embeddedness scale 
described above. 
Thirdly, evidence suggests that polyamorists engage in significant 
risks in order to pursue that lifestyle.  These risks make it unlikely that a 
significant percentage of polyamorists have embraced polyamory in a 
haphazard or superficial way.  Poly parents’ potential loss of custody 
due to arguments that polyamory will harm their children is one of the 
most important of such risks.117  Employment discrimination is also a 
in other words “the psychological systems that give children feelings and intuitions that make local 
stories, practices, and moral arguments more or less appealing,” are likely innate and that values are 
based on a combination of these foundations and individual experience); see generally Roger P. Claxton 
et al., Cognitive Style as a Potential Antecedent to Values, 11 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 355 
(1996) (arguing that values stem to some extent from one’s cognitive style and that cognitive style 
appears to be innate); see id. at 359 (“People are almost never guided by a single value . . . . Thus many 
researchers . . . belie[ve] that ‘single values are salient only in the context of an entire value system.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 117. Bennett, supra note 71.  See also Emens, supra note 69, at 310–12 (describing a high-profile 
custody battle between a poly mother and the child’s paternal grandmother); Rambukkana, supra note 
16, at 148 (citing loss of custody of children as one of the potential “serious . . . legal consequences” of 
“public polyamory”); William C. Duncan, The More the Merrier?, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 2, 2010, 
available at http://spectator.org/archives/2010/09/02/the-more-the-merrier (arguing that polyamory 
likely harms children based on research on the effects of non-marital serial monogamy on children); 
Stanley Kurtz, Rick Santorum was Right: Meet the Future of Marriage in America, NAT’L REV., Mar. 
23, 2005, available at http:www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200503230746.asp (suggesting that the 
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potential consequence of openly espousing polyamory,118 with the result 
that many polyamorists appear to remain closeted at work.119  
Additionally, in one survey, polyamorists identified “employment 
nondiscrimination as one of their three highest priority legal issues.”120  
Furthermore, there is evidence that children of poly parents face 
harassment at school.121  Finally, out polyamory has been associated 
generally with social “stigma and attendant loss of power within 
monogamous society,” such that poly individuals report losing their 
friends, being alienated from their families, and being ostracized from 
spiritual and other communities as a result of revealing their 
polyamory.122  Indeed, forty-three percent of polys in one study reported 
assumed effects of polyamory on children are one of the strongest reasons to oppose the right to 
polyamorous marriages). 
  While only limited research exists at this time on the potential effects on children of having 
polyamorous parents, it appears that the assumptions of harm are unwarranted.  See generally Elisabeth 
Sheff, Strategies in Polyamorous Parenting, in UNDERSTANDING NON-MONOGAMIES 169 (Meg Barker 
& Darren Langdridge eds., 2009).  But see Maura Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: 
Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 509–15 (2003) (describing and quoting from one 
therapist’s depiction of various harms she experienced in the course of her upbringing in a polyamorous 
family).  Dr. Sheff, a sociologist, is currently engaged in a study on the effects on children of being 
brought up by polyamorous parents.  Although the study is not yet complete and the results are 
preliminary, she reports that her findings to date indicate that “poly families are no more harmful [than 
monogamous families], and might be beneficial in some ways” and that “preliminary accounts indicate 
that polyness does not loom large in these kids’ lives.”  Email from Elisabeth Sheff, Assistant Professor, 
Ga. State Univ., to author (June 30, 2010, 7:43 AM) (on file with author). 
 118. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 148; see also Emens, supra note 69, at 362. 
 119. Sheff, supra note 75, at 277–78.  Polyamorists also may be choosing to remain closeted in 
other facets of their lives.  Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 148 (noting that “[o]ften, if a polyamorous 
person is single, or in a couple, passing is the preferred strategy” and that “few people want [non-
monogamy] linked to their identity”).  See also Aviram, supra note 67, at 278 (describing the poly 
practice of living “under the radar” in order to avoid government intrusion into one’s personal life); 
Reiss, supra note 68, at 51 (“[M]ost polys are, perhaps not surprisingly, closeted.”).  But see Emens, 
supra note 69, at 331 n.316 (quoting from a magazine article in which a lawyer advising a poly 
readership notes that “[m]ost people are not ‘comfortable’ being closeted” at work). 
 120. Emens, supra note 69, at 331 n.316. 
 121. See generally Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli, ‘To Pass, Border or Pollute,’ Polyfamilies Go to 
School, in UNDERSTANDING NON-MONOGAMIES 182 (Meg Barker & Darren Langdridge eds., 2009). 
 122. Sheff, supra note 75, at 277; see also Sheff, supra note 117, at 177–79 (documenting the 
stigma that polyamorous families face); Weitzman, supra note 76, at 142 (documenting the fact that 
polyamorous people often have difficulty finding responsive psychotherapists); Rambukkana, supra 
note 16, at 148 (describing loss of friends as a potential social consequence of “public polyamory”).  
Similarly, Christian Klesse describes two bisexual polyamorous interviewees.  One interviewee reported 
that her friends were critical of her polyamory and sympathetic to the problems it caused her partner.  
The other interviewee reported receiving criticisms from his partner’s friends as a result of his 
polyamory.  Christian Klesse, Paradoxes in Gender Relations, in UNDERSTANDING NON-MONOGAMIES 
109, 115–16 (Meg Barker & Darren Langdridge eds., 2009).  More generally, in her “barely truthful” 
poetic memoir about embarking on a polyamorous relationship contemporaneously with moving to 
Hawaii, Juliana Spahr states that “[l]ack of understanding was all around.  It defined them [the 
participants in the polyamorous relationship].”  SPAHR, supra note 62, at 16, 217. 
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having directly experienced prejudice as a result of being poly and about 
a quarter of the respondents had experienced verbal abuse based on their 
polyamorism.123  Although these potential consequences mirror many of 
those associated with out homosexuality, the consequences of out 
polyamory are probably nowhere near as prevalent as those for 
homosexuality, a fact which is likely due in large part to the greater 
salience of homosexuality within our culture.124  Nonetheless, the 
consequences for out polyamory are sufficiently severe and, based on 
the available evidence, appear to cause sufficient fear among 
polyamorists that it is unlikely that anyone, much less a significant 
number of people, would take on the lifestyle or identity of polyamory 
lightly.  Thus, these potentially severe consequences indirectly affirm 
that polyamory is most likely at least somewhere near the middle of the 
embeddedness scale and that it is almost certainly not at the superficial 
or extraneous end. 
The fourth reason that polyamory is likely to be considerably 
embedded in individual identity is that, as documented by Holning Lau 
in the context of LGB identity, romantic and sexual relationships play a 
constitutive role in personal identity in American culture.125  Lau has 
documented this phenomenon as applied to LGB couples in the public 
accommodations context, but his research applies with some force to the 
context of polyamory as well.  Borrowing from collective rights theories 
traditionally applied to protect minority cultures, Lau argues that “an 
individual’s identity is inextricably linked to her memberships in certain 
social collectives.  Accordingly, protecting that individual requires not 
only protecting her individual right to associate with those collective 
entities, but also protecting those entities’ aggregate rights to 
develop.”126  For Lau, the paradigmatic collective entity in the LGB 
public accommodations context is the same-sex couple, including the 
long-term couple, the short-term couple, and the potential couple;127 this 
 123. Weber, supra note 76, at 5. 
 124. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 69, at 352–53 (noting that polyamorists have not undergone the 
“perverse implantation” described by Foucault that “fixed homosexuals with a perceived pathology in 
the eyes of sexology and, ultimately, the broader culture” and that it is neither “feasible ([n]or 
presumably desirable) to recommend that they pursue one” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Aviram, supra note 67, at 272 (noting that “polyamory has not, historically, suffered 
the social stigma associated with heterosexuality”).  But see Weitzman, supra note 76, at 142 (stating 
that, in the therapy field, “polyamory is often pathologized”). 
 125. See generally Lau, supra note 2; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological Ass’n 
et al. at *4, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“Sexual attraction and expression are 
important components of romantic relationships,” and close relationship bonds are formed to meet 
“personal needs for love, attachment, and intimacy.”). 
 126. Lau, supra note 2, at 1273. 
 127. Id. at 1309. 
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is “because one’s sexual orientation classification is necessarily defined 
by whom she desires to partner with, regardless of whether she identifies 
with a larger sexual orientation group.”128  Thus, in one hypothetical, he 
describes a bisexual woman in a same-sex couple who wants to go to a 
resort that discriminates against same-sex couples with her partner.  Lau 
explains that, even if the woman does not view “her membership in a 
same-sex couple as an expression of bisexuality,” she and her partner 
want the resort “to recognize their union, not because it expresses 
membership in a gay or bisexual community, but because the union is a 
collective entity that is important in and of itself.”129 
Moreover, in analogizing LGB rights to recognition of same-sex 
couples to the rights of minority cultures, Lau’s work implicitly 
recognizes the central importance of relationships in our culture.  For 
instance, in describing the theory of group rights that he is extending to 
support the right to recognition of same-sex couples, he explains that “to 
protect the individual’s right to self-development, it is imperative to 
protect the cultural group on which the individual relies to develop her 
sense of self.  Without the larger cultural group, the individual can no 
longer fully develop herself as an individual.”130  Later, he speaks of the 
role of a same-sex relationship in an individual’s self-development and 
particularly the development of her sexual identity.131  He also describes 
the “identity-defining bonds” that develop between members of a couple 
and the evidence that they are formed through sex, physical affection, 
“shared goals and values, mutual support and ongoing commitment.”132  
Thus, Lau’s comparison between couples and minority cultures 
resonates because romantic and sexual relationships are culturally 
valued as integral to personal development, and there is no reason that 
his insight should not apply to polyamorous relationships as well.133 
In fact, Lau’s work on couples is largely transferrable to the context 
of polyamory.  He recognizes in the hypothetical cited above that the 
union is important to the individuals involved in and of itself, regardless 
of whether the individuals identify themselves or their relationship with 
the larger LGB community.  Thus, his theory is largely based on: (1) the 
importance of the relationship itself and cultural recognition of the 
 128. Id. 1273. 
 129. Id. at 1300–01. 
 130. Id. at 1282. 
 131. Id. at 1289–90. 
 132. Id. at 1288 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. The view of relationships as integral to personal development and happiness appears to have 
gained some traction in the Supreme Court as well.  See, e.g., Levit, supra note 30, at 30 (discussing 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003)). 
32
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/5
I-TWEEDY 8/27/2011  5:17:55 PM 
2011] POLYAMORY AS A SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1493 
 
relationship to the individuals involved and (2) the ways in which the 
relationship and its recognition support individual self-development.  
Were it not for the centrality of personal relationships in American 
culture, Lau would have no basis to argue that protection of LGB 
individuals from discrimination was insufficient to protect their rights as 
LGB persons and that application of a couples-rights theory was 
therefore necessary.  Moreover, in recognizing homosexuality to be 
relationship-based, Lau reveals sexual orientation as traditionally 
understood to be substantially relationship-based, thus revealing an 
important parallel between polyamory and the current concept of sexual 
orientation. 
Polyamory is of course centered on relationships, and it is reasonable 
to conclude that polyamorists, like LGB persons, suffer dignitary harms 
when their relationships are not supported or recognized.134  Quoting 
Charles Taylor, Lau states that “[n]onrecognition or misrecognition . . . 
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, 
and reduced mode of being.”135  In the context of polyamory, where  
only one of a person’s two or more relationships would likely be 
publicly recognized, the injury may be better described as partial 
recognition, which could be expected to be a similar, but perhaps less 
severe, injury than non-recognition or misrecognition.136  Indeed 
research on polyamory suggests that polyamorous relationships may aid 
the participant’s self-development,137 which Lau’s work indicates is the 
case for relationships generally and specifically for same-sex 
relationships.  Moreover, Lau’s work, while focused exclusively on 
same-sex relationships, explicitly seeks to protect non-monogamous 
couples as well as monogamous ones.138  Thus, by demonstrating the 
centrality of the personal romantic relationship in American culture, 
Lau’s research indirectly affirms that polyamorous identity, which is 
based largely on having multiple simultaneous relationships, is likely to 
 134. See, e.g., SPAHR, supra note 62, at 19–20 (“There were awkward moments, moments that 
they did not . . . really know how to deal with . . . . There were those moments such as when one of them 
put down two names on the guest slot for the office holiday party and were told that only partners could 
come, not roommates.”). 
 135. Lau, supra note 2, at 1275 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. See SPAHR, supra note 62, at 16 (reporting that the three members of the polyamorous 
relationship she describes were “defined” by “misunderstanding”); id. at 177–79 (alluding to the pain 
and fear resulting from being closeted about one’s poly relationship when meeting new people and in 
relatively public contexts, such as a Spanish class). 
 137. Weitzman, supra note 76, at 140 (“New aspects of self sometimes emerge as one relates 
closely to additional people.”); see also Reiss, supra note 68, at 51 (“[F]or many of today’s multi-lovers, 
poly is chosen as a path toward personal evolution and spiritual enlightenment.”). 
 138. Lau, supra note 2, at 1289–90. 
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be a considerably embedded identity.139  His work also reveals 
polyamory to be similar to traditional sexual orientation in its focus on 
relationships, a fact which supports defining polyamory as a type of 
sexual orientation. 
Finally, by drawing significant parallels with LGB identity, both 
Elizabeth Emens’s legal scholarship and Geri Weitzman’s psychological 
research demonstrate that polyamorous identity is likely considerably 
embedded in the individual.  Examining Emens’s research first, she has 
theorized a scale of polyamorous dispositions similar to the Kinsey scale 
for homosexuality:140 
 A consideration of “poly” and “mono” identity, on a theoretical level, 
suggests that few people’s desires fall squarely into either camp.  In 
theory at least, a completely poly disposition might be understood to 
involve not only desires for multiple sexual and domestic partners, but 
desires for one’s partner(s) to have multiple sexual and domestic partners.  
A person with this disposition would presumably be happier in 
nonmonogamous relationships, and perhaps happy only in 
nonmonogamous relationships.  By contrast, a completely mono 
disposition might be understood to involve exclusive sexual and domestic 
desire for just one other person, as well as the desire for that person to 
have only oneself as a sexual and domestic partner.  A person with this 
disposition would presumably be happier in—and perhaps happy only 
in—a monogamous relationship.  Few people are likely to embody either 
disposition completely.141 
Emens goes onto suggest that the polyamorous to monogamous 
continuum has four components: (1) the scope of one’s own sexual 
desire (i.e., does a person sexually desire only one or multiple people); 
(2) one’s wishes for his or her partner with respect to the scope of his or 
her partner’s sexual desires; (3) the number of ongoing 
domestic/romantic partners that one personally desires; and (4) the 
number of ongoing domestic/romantic partners that one desires for his or 
her partner.142  She then theorizes that most people are polyamorous in 
their own personal sexual desires, in other words that they sexually 
desire more than one person, but that they wish their partners to only 
 139. This discussion is not meant to imply anything negative about singleness or to validate in any 
sense the discrimination that single people may face in various segments of society.  See, e.g., Mario L. 
Barnes, Univ. of Calif., Irvine, & Trina Jones, Univ. of Calif., Irvine/Duke Univ., Singlism: Do the 
Rights of Unmarried Workers Need Protection?, Presentation at the Law & Society Ass’n 2010 Annual 
Meeting (May 27, 2010). 
 140. Emens, supra note 69, at 284, 355–61. 
 141. Id. at 284. 
 142. Id. at 356–59. 
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desire one person.143  Similarly, she concludes from the scarcity of 
polyamorous relationships that most people both desire only one 
ongoing domestic/romantic partnership and desire that their partners 
have only one such relationship.144 
Although there are important differences between the two approaches, 
Emens’s four-point determination for polyamorous dispositions is 
roughly analogous to the scale for measuring levels of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality developed in the 1940s by the pioneering sexologist 
Alfred Kinsey.145  Unlike Emens’s four-point inquiry in which each 
point appears to operate in isolation, Kinsey’s seven-point scale is a 
linear progression from pure heterosexuality to pure homosexuality 
based on levels of attraction and sexual experience.146  However, like 
Kinsey’s measure of heterosexual and homosexual dispositions, 
Emens’s scale attempts to measure individuals’ dispositions toward 
monogamy and polyamory.147 
Another difference in approach between Emens and Kinsey is that 
Emens is not focused on sexual experiences but rather on “identit[ies] 
defined by the desires of the participants.”148  Homosexuality and 
heterosexuality, however, can be (and often are) similarly defined by 
desire alone.149  Moreover, Emens’s formulation of the components of a 
polyamorous disposition demonstrates that it is possible to conceive of 
individuals as more or less polyamorous independently of their behavior, 
just as essentialists and strong constructivists currently conceive of 
sexual orientation.  Thus, as recognized by one of her critics, Emens’s 
work demonstrates that polyamory is properly thought of as an identity 
that is similar in many respects to heterosexuality and homosexuality.150 
The psychotherapist Geri Weitzman also draws important parallels 
between polyamorous and homosexual identities.  She suggests that 
people either are or are not disposed to polyamory, although she 
 143. Id. at 359. 
 144. Id. at 359. 
 145. See, e.g., Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of 
Psychological Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 495, 533 (2002). 
 146. See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101, 
132 (2004); Hermann, supra note 145, at 533. 
 147. Emens, supra note 69, at 355–59. 
 148. Id. at 355. 
 149. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005), available at 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/collegiate (defining “homosexual” as “of, relating to, or 
characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward another of the same sex,” among other 
definitions); DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 12 (“Most scientists consider desire, not behavior, the marker of 
sexual orientation.”). 
 150. Kurtz, supra note 117. 
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describes the phenomenon in less detail than does Emens.151  For 
instance, Weitzman refers to “[p]olyamorously inclined people” and 
draws an explicit comparison with sexual orientation when she states 
that “just as people vary in sexual orientation, so too do they vary in 
preference for intimacies with one vs. multiple partners.”152  Weitzman 
also describes the process of coming out to oneself as polyamorous as 
similar to the coming out process that an LGB person goes through: 
There are many milestones along the path of polyamory identity 
development.  The first is the process of coming out to oneself about 
one’s interest in a polyamorous lifestyle–similar to the coming out 
process that is experienced by bisexual, lesbian, trangender and gay 
people.  There is a recognition that one’s identity is changing along with 
one’s romantic preferences, and that one’s evolution is taking a different 
path from what the mainstream society expects.153 
Thus Weitzman perceives the seminal queer experience of coming out as 
having a close parallel in polyamory.  Moreover, she refers to 
“polyamory identity development,” demonstrating that she sees 
polyamory as an identity.154  While the term “identity development” 
may invoke a constructed identity, rather than black and white 
essentialism, the constructed identity that she describes appears to be 
deep-seated: the idea that a person would recognize that her own identity 
was changing and “taking a different path” than society expected 
suggests a lack of control on the individual’s part.  Thus, Weitzman 
describes polyamory as a deeply embedded identity in two ways.  First, 
she draws explicit comparisons with homosexuality, which, in the world 
of psychology at least, is considered a deep-seated identity.155  Such 
comparisons therefore implicitly suggest that polyamory is also a deep-
seated identity.  Secondly, she speaks explicitly of polyamorous identity 
and does so in a way that suggests that an individual’s identity as 
polyamorous is largely a matter of personal evolution rather than a 
choice. 
These five sources tend to suggest that polyamory is deeply 
embedded to varying degrees and overall that, at a minimum, it is 
 151. Weitzman, supra note 76, at 140. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 148. 
 154. See also SPAHR, supra note 62, at 22 (“[I]t is a story of [three participants in a polyamorous 
relationship] coming to an identity, coming to realize that they not only had a gender . . . , but they also 
had a . . . sexuality that was decided for them without their consent and by historical events . . . . So it is 
also a story of finding ease in discomfort.”). 
 155. See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 11; see generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. 
Psychological Ass’n et al., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); see also Emens, 
supra note 69, at 342 (“Gay identity is viewed by many to be a deeply rooted element of identity . . . .”). 
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somewhere around the middle of the embeddedness scale.  The 
statements of polyamorous individuals indicating personal histories of 
polyamorous tendencies that date back to adolescence suggest a strongly 
embedded identity, located near the most embedded pole on the scale.  
Similarly, Emens’s theory of a polyamorous disposition and the parallels 
drawn by Weitzman with LGB identity also support an understanding of 
polyamorous identity as deeply embedded.  Rambukkana’s discussion of 
his own polyamorous identity may suggest a slightly less embedded 
identity but still one that is considerably embedded.  The extent to which 
one’s personal identity and development flows from romantic and sexual 
relationships in American culture, as explored by Lau, also supports a 
notion of polyamory as a considerably embedded identity.  Finally, the 
values that polyamory embodies and the risks that polyamorous people 
undertake to practice polyamory suggest an identity that is at least 
moderately embedded. 
The fact that one of the keystones of polyamory, sexual desire for 
more than one person, however, is also shared by virtually every 
member of society may be understood to suggest that polyamorists are 
not distinct from the general population, at least based on this trait., 
although the trait is likely deeply embedded.156  As Emens explains with 
respect to non-monogamous behavior: “[t]he poly ethic of honesty posits 
that many more people engage in non[-]monogamous behavior than own 
up to it.  From this perspective, polys may seem less a distinct minority 
than outspoken representatives of the masses.”157  In this sense, one of 
Emens’s four components of polyamory—sexual desire for more than 
one person—while it may well be deeply embedded as a constructed (or 
potentially essentialist) identity trait and may even be immutable, is by 
no means unique to polyamorists.  This is problematic because it will 
likely cause polyamorists difficulty in arguing that a central component 
of their polyamorist identity sets them apart and is a basis of 
discrimination.  On the other hand, however, Emens’s other three 
components of polyamory—wanting one’s partner to have sexual desires 
for others, wanting to have more than one continuing romantic/domestic 
partnership, and wanting one’s partner to have more than one such 
partnership—do appear to be much more unique.  Moreover, these three 
components are likely to be at least somewhat deeply embedded, 
although the first and the third may be considerably less embedded than 
sexual desire.158  The second—wanting more than one ongoing 
 156. See Emens, supra note 69, at 343, 353; see also id. at 345 (“[I]t seems a fair assumption that 
almost everyone has at some time felt desire for more than one person.”). 
 157. Id. at 343. 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 330.  Emens explains the poly term “compersion,” or a “feeling of happiness 
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romantic/domestic partnership for oneself—may be between the most 
embedded pole and the mid-point of the scale. 
Thus, the ubiquity of sexual desire for more than one person, which is 
one of the central and most embedded components of polyamory, does 
not mean that polyamory cannot be a unique identity.  Even ignoring 
this component of poly identity as formulated by Emens, the other three 
components still appear to be at least moderately embedded or perhaps 
more so.  Thus, it appears that the embeddedness of polyamory varies to 
some degree by the individual and that sometimes it will fall near the 
most embedded end of the scale.  In many (and perhaps most) other 
cases, however, it will be at least at a moderately embedded level. 
3. Is Discrimination Against Polyamorous Individuals Sufficient to 
Warrant Anti-Discrimination Protections? 
As discussed above, polyamorists risk custody loss, workplace 
discrimination, loss of friends, alienation from their families, and 
ostracism from spiritual and other communities as a result of revealing 
their polyamory.  In addition, their children often face discrimination at 
school.  Indeed, in one study, nearly half of poly respondents reported 
having experienced prejudice as a result of their polyamory.159  
Additionally, Emens has noted that the “social hostility [against 
relationships involving more than two people] sustains various legal 
burdens on polyamorists, including two-person marriage and partnership 
laws, adultery and bigamy laws, [and] residential zoning laws.”160  
Furthermore, Rambukkana documented negative reactions to the 
formation of an on-campus polyamory group that included the university 
newspaper’s public ridicule of the group on the basis that the group was 
comprised of “a bunch of ‘culty’ sex maniacs” and the suggestion that 
in knowing that others you love share joy with each other, especially taking joy in the knowledge that 
your beloveds are expressing their love for one another” and then states that “[p]olys generally aim to 
develop and expand their compersion, while understanding, working through, and getting past jealous 
responses.”  Id.  The idea that polyamous individuals could “develop and expand” their compersion 
suggests that their desire for their partners to have more than one sexual relationship and more than one 
ongoing romantic/domestic partnership is, to some degree, dependent on personal choice.  This element 
of personal choice indicates a lower degree of embeddedness, but, because deep-seated values are 
driving the personal choice and because it is unlikely that one’s desires for one’s partner are completely 
subject to personal choice, these two elements of Emens’s formulation would still be at least moderately 
embedded and perhaps more so.  For evidence that sexual desire itself is deeply embedded, see, for 
example, DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 11 (“Even when women undergo significant shifts in their patterns 
of erotic response, they typically report that such changes are unexpected and beyond their 
control . . . . This finding is consistent with the extensive evidence . . . showing that efforts to change 
sexual orientation through ‘reparative therapy’ simply do not work.”). 
 159. See supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text. 
 160. Emens, supra note 69, at 283. 
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the group was a “recruitment machine” that sucked people in “‘with 
promises of sex and more sex.’”161  Rambukkana also documented 
resistance to the group among lesbian polyamorists and others who 
dismissed the group as a “straight pickup scene[],” apparently objecting 
to the group’s mainstreaming a practice that was perceived to be the 
rightful province of sex radicals.162 
The reactions of the columnist in the school newspaper suggest that 
polyamory is likely to be erroneously associated with hyper-sexuality163 
and that cultural shame regarding sexuality may therefore be triggered 
by public polyamory, which in turn is used to denigrate polyamorists.164  
The reactions of lesbian polyamorists suggest that public polyamory, 
especially involving opposite-sex relationships, may incite disapproval 
and distancing tactics among lesbian and other queer-identified groups 
who perceive such polyamory “as a corruption of something 
pure . . . that arose in its essential form in the utter rejection of 
heterosexist culture, that is in lesbian feminism.”165  In other words, to 
the extent that one is identified with or allied with the Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, coming out as 
polyamorous could also result in one’s alienation from that 
community.166 
These forms of discrimination are considerable, and they have the 
potential to impose severe, indeed devastating, burdens on individuals 
who espouse polyamory.  On the other hand, however, it does seem 
clear that, despite the existence of laws, including criminal adultery and 
bigamy laws,167 and other social mechanisms that penalize polyamory, 
 161. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 145. 
 162. Id. at 146, 149. 
 163. See also In re Aleksandree M.M., No. M2010-01084-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 3749423, at *4 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2010) (describing a parent’s polyamory as having contributed to a “sexually 
charged, abusive and dangerous environment in which the children were being raised”); Emens, supra 
note 69, at 343 (“The universalizing account of nonmonogamy may seem obvious: Of course most 
people want to sleep with others; they just resist that impulse.  From this perspective, polyamory may 
seem, like bisexuality, to be a form of greed or indulgence.”); Bokma, supra note 68 (describing the 
popular misperception that “‘polyamory is like having your cake and then having more cake—endless 
cake forever’” (quoting Jillian Deri)). 
 164. Accord Klesse, supra note 122, at 110 (detailing the prejudice that women in particular are 
exposed to in patriarchal culture as a result of non-monogamy and suggesting that certain groups of 
women such as those who are working-class, African-American, or Jewish, are disproportionately 
burdened). 
 165. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 149. 
 166. See id. at 149–51. 
 167. As the Court has explained, criminal laws place a severe burden on an individual.  See, e.g., 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (recognizing that criminal jurisdiction “involves a far more 
direct intrusion on personal liberties” than civil jurisdiction), superseded by statute as stated in United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–76 (2003) (stating 
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“polyamory has not, historically, suffered the social stigma associated 
with homosexuality.”168  How then should it be decided whether 
polyamory warrants protection? 
a. Cooper’s Methodology for Examining Whether Protections Should Be 
Extended to a Given Group 
Davina Cooper has developed a method for evaluating whether a class 
designation is “emerging as an organising principle of inequality in its 
own right” and therefore warrants special protection under the law.169  
Using cigarette smokers as an example, Cooper argues that, even 
assuming “that cigarette smokers are subject to significant 
discrimination, marginalisation and other kinds of disadvantage,” to 
evaluate whether smokers need special protection, “smoking’s more 
general impact on modes of power, institutional structures, and social 
dynamics” should be examined.170  She notes that “[t]here is no 
evidence that smoking, as the enactment and reproduction of socially 
asymmetrical positions, affects institutional forms such as education, 
local government, the military or law” and that “[i]t also does not render 
modes of power intelligible.”171  Finally, she asks whether, 
just as we talk about institutional or national cultures being gendered in 
ways that reproduce the asymmetry of values and norms associated with 
femininity and masculinity, could we talk about them equally as being 
‘smoked’, where the values and meanings associated with smoking are 
prescribed less value than their non-smoking binary counterparts?172 
Cooper concludes that it is not possible to intelligibly talk about 
cultures being saturated with smoking and non-smoking-based binaries 
where the smoking portion is consistently devalued.  Although such 
binaries (e.g., habit/non-addiction and chemical/natural) are applied to 
denigrate smoking and smokers, they are not driven by smoking 
imagery; rather the imagery is borrowed from other contexts.173  Cooper 
further concludes that, although smoking is linked to “conduct-based 
stigmatisation, status-building, and the more general dynamic processes 
of community formation,” that the linkage is “very mediated” in that 
that “[t]he stigma . . . impose[d by Texas’s law criminalizing homosexual sodomy] is not trivial” and 
describing the law’s import “for the dignity of the persons charged”). 
 168. Aviram, supra note 67, at 272. 
 169. COOPER, supra note 16, at 63. 
 170. Id. at 62–63. 
 171. Id. at 63. 
 172. Id. at 63. 
 173. Id. at 63–64. 
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smoking and these social dynamics “exist independently of each 
other.”174  Thus, “the social response toward smoking is far more fluid 
and revisable than is the case with other social constituencies.”175  In 
Cooper’s view, because smoking does not appear to be tied to “an 
organising principle[] of inequality,” “a more evaluative process” is 
required to determine whether legal protections need to be extended to 
smokers.176  By contrast, “where organising principles of 
inequality . . . are at stake, we cannot trust our processes of evaluation 
and judgment.”177 
Published cases explicitly discussing polyamory appear to be few and 
far between.  While these cases generally portray polyamory in a 
negative light, they are too few in number to warrant a conclusion, on 
their own, that polyamory constitutes an organizing principle of 
inequality.178  There is, however, a wealth of law pertaining to non-
 174. Id. at 64. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 66. 
 177. Id. at 66. 
 178. The most in-depth discussion of polyamory occurred in In re Aleksandree M.M., No. M2010-
01084-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 3749423 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2010), a case in which the court 
upheld the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her four children.  The court upheld the 
termination of parental rights on the basis that the mother had failed to protect the oldest child from 
abuse, specifically rape by her stepfather, which started on the child’s ninth birthday.  Id. at *3–*4.  
While such grounds for termination appear to be more than sufficient, the court used the mother’s 
polyamorous lifestyle, which the biological father had also previously participated in, to bolster the 
termination decision, indicating that the mother’s practice of polyamory and sadomasochism contributed 
to her unfitness as a parent and her inability to protect her daughter from abuse.  Id. at *4 (“Mother’s 
participation in the polyamory lifestyle and her master/slave relationship with Paul. M. [the abusive 
stepfather] no doubt colored her perspective of the sexually charged, abusive and dangerous 
environment in which the children were being raised, the reality of which resulted in Paul M.’s abuse of 
the child.”); id. (“[E]ach of the children were [sic] exposed to an environment, based in substantial part 
on Mother’s lifestyle choices, that put them at risk of abuse . . . .”).  Notably, the juvenile court had 
awarded custody of the two older children to their biological father, who had also, at least in the past, 
practiced polyamory.  His custody, however, was not an issue on appeal.  Id. at *1 n.3. 
  Less involved discussions of polyamory occurred in two dissents in child custody cases 
where the majority opinions allowed visitation rights to someone who was not a biological parent; in 
these cases, the dissenters raised the spectre of polyamory in arguing that the majority opinions had 
inadvertently sanctioned allowing parental rights to groups of more than two polyamorous parents.  
Kulstad v. Manaci, 220 P.3d 595, 617 (Mont. 2009) (Rice, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court had 
improperly awarded parental rights to a lesbian non-adoptive co-parent after the dissolution of her 
relationship with the adoptive parent); Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 334–35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) 
(Barker, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in awarding visitation rights to the stepmother after the biological 
father’s death, the court had inadvertently paved the way for awards of such rights to groups of more 
than two polyamorous parents).  Notably, the Riepe majority attempted to rebut the dissent’s contentions 
regarding polyamory.  Id. at 316. 
  Polyamory also came up in one custody case where the parties had engaged in the practice.  
Cross v. Cross, 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th 12 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2008).  In Cross, a married Pennsylvania couple had 
apparently engaged in a polyamorous relationship with another married couple in Iowa, which 
ultimately led to the dissolution of both marriages; Mrs. Cross eventually moved in with the Iowa couple 
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monogamy that demonstrates that, unlike the smoking/non-smoking 
distinction, the monogamy/non-monogamy distinction does have 
significant impact upon modes of power, institutional structures, and 
social dynamics.  While non-monogamy is not synonymous with 
polyamory,179 it is nevertheless a sine qua non of polyamory as well as 
the practice that appears to drive most of the prejudice against 
polyamorists.180  Moreover, polyamorists have overtly embraced non-
monogamy in a way that many others who engage in non-monogamous 
and the Iowa wife temporarily stayed in the marital home for financial reasons, despite no longer being 
in a romantic relationship with her husband.  Id.  The court, which awarded custody to the wife, 
mischaracterized polyamory as “wife swapping” and described it as “grossly inappropriate conduct.”  Id.  
It stated, however, that the parties had both willingly engaged in the conduct and were thus equally to 
blame for the resulting marital breakdown. 
  Three criminal cases also mention polyamory.  In one case, the court held that the victim’s 
online profession of polyamory was inadmissible and did not fall under an exception to the rape shield 
law.  Truitt v. State, No. 2007-SC-000376-MR, 2008 WL 4691629, at *1, *3 (Ky. Oct. 23, 2008).  
Another involved a mother who was appealing her murder conviction and who had engaged in 
polyamorous relationships while her seventeen-month-old daughter, who ultimately died due to her 
mother’s neglect, was very ill.  State v. Rhoades, No. 35408-0-II, 2008 WL 933494, at *1–*2, *6 (Wash. 
Ct. App., Apr. 8, 2008).  The polyamorous activity was apparently used to show the mother’s ability to 
function and thus to rebut her diminished capacity defense.  Id. at *6.  Finally, in a third case, in which a 
husband was charged with murdering his wife, the court held that testimony regarding the wife’s 
negative views of her husband’s polyamory was neither hearsay nor unduly prejudicial.  State v. Petrick, 
652 S.E.2d 688, 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  I identified only one other case in which polyamory was 
mentioned.  In this case, the court referred to polyamory merely to explain the interest of an 
organizational plaintiff in an obscenity case.  Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
  The termination case and the custody cases in particular demonstrate negative judicial views 
of polyamory.  In In re Aleksandree M.M., the court used the mother’s polyamorous lifestyle to bolster a 
termination decision, despite the fact that nothing about polyamory lends itself to child rape, and, 
indeed, its requirement of consent definitionally precludes polyamorists from making sexual advances 
on children.  In re Aleksandree M.M., 2010 WL 3749423, at *4.  Cf. Jonathan Turley, Polygamy Laws 
Expose Our Own Hypocrisy, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 2004, at A.13 (“[B]anning polygamy is no more a 
solution to child abuse than banning marriage would be a solution to spousal abuse.”).  The court’s 
conclusion appears to have been driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of polyamory, a 
conflation of hyper-sexuality with polyamory, and a general prejudice against unconventional sexuality 
as embodied in polyamory.  Given the stepfather’s egregious misconduct in In re Aleksandree M.M. and 
the mother’s continued state of denial about it, however, it is hard to evaluate how much the judge’s 
prejudice against polyamory weighed into the decision, which would most likely have been a foregone 
conclusion even without the presence of polyamory and sadomasochism.  2010 WL 3749423, at *5. 
  The Kulstad and Riepe dissents also gratuitously attack polyamory.  In Kulstad and Riepe, 
polyamory was not remotely at issue, and yet the dissenting judges saw the potential recognition of the 
rights of polyamorous co-parents as an evil that had to be guarded against.  See Kulstad, 220 P.3d at 
617; Riepe, 91 P.3d at 334–35.  In Cross, the court took pains to express strong disapproval of 
polyamory (which it also misconstrued), terming it “grossly inappropriate.”  Cross, 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th 12.  
Although the criminal cases are harder to evaluate, the courts’ and individual judges’ negative treatment 
of polyamory in the custody and termination cases remains striking. 
 179. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 69, at 344 (describing an author’s “blur[ring of] the distinction 
between nonmonogamy and polyamory”). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 347–49. 
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actions have not.  For instance, while there may be good reasons to 
decriminalize adultery even when practiced in its traditional form,181 the 
traditional adulterer, who commits to a monogamous relationship with a 
spouse and then secretly engages in a sexual relationship with a third 
person, is acquiescing to the societal framework of monogamy in a way 
that the polyamorist is not.  By lying and sneaking around to engage in 
the relationship with a third party, the traditional adulterer could be said 
to tacitly acquiesce in the societal view that his or her additional 
relationship is wrong or at least socially unacceptable.  Moreover, by 
hiding his or her actions, such a person attempts to have this illicit 
relationship without facing any social consequences for it (and while 
harming the other party to the monogamous relationship).  Finally, at the 
very least, the prototypical adulterer is not challenging the framework of 
monogamy, but instead, by continuing to live under a pledge of 
monogamy, he or she overtly supports the framework, while secretly 
falling short of, or violating, it.  By contrast, polyamorists have rejected 
the framework and consciously attempt to live outside of it.182  Because 
polyamorists explicitly embrace non-monogamy and, at a minimum, let 
everyone with whom they enter a romantic relationship know of this 
preference, polyamorists are uniquely likely to be subject to 
discrimination, including de jure discrimination against non-
monogamists, and it is arguably particularly unfair to burden 
polyamorists with criminal sanctions, given that they have been honest 
with those who would otherwise stand to be hurt by their lifestyle and 
that they have made a conscious decision to reject the strictures of 
monogamy, which would seemingly be a decision every person has the 
right, as a matter of personal liberty, to make. 
In this sense, the traditional adulterer is similar to the individual who 
experiences same-sex desires and occasionally acts on them but lives as 
a straight person.183  In the vast majority of cases, such an individual has 
little need for anti-discrimination laws that protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination because he or she overtly rejects that lifestyle 
and identity and instead embraces traditional heterosexuality.  Those 
who put themselves at risk by adopting and overtly performing a 
proscribed identity appear to be more in need of, and arguably may be 
 181. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327, 1414–16 
(2008). 
 182. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 68 (describing monogamy not as a “goal” but as “a point of 
departure” for polyamorists). 
 183. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (March 2006 draft entry) (defining “down-low” as 
“of or relating to men who secretly engage in homosexual activity”). 
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more entitled to, specific legal protections.184  Nonetheless, anti-
discrimination protections for polyamory may have the incidental 
beneficial effect of encouraging those who desire to live the overtly non-
monogamous lifestyle that polyamory embodies but who previously did 
not have the courage to do so or perhaps did not know such a life was 
possible to make their desires known to those with whom they are 
involved and to others.185  Because of the harm that closeting causes to 
closeted individuals,186 this would be a socially desirable consequence 
of anti-discrimination protection
Thus, application of Cooper’s analysis to the monogamy/non-
monogamy binary helps us to determine whether polyamory potentially 
warrants anti-discrimination protections.  Although American culture 
privileges monogamy in innumerable ways,187 several key examples that 
particularly relate to the law are discussed below. 
 184. A similar analysis would apply to those who are erroneously perceived to be polyamorous, 
assuming there is a substantial risk of such a perception, because, to the degree it is socially desirable to 
protect against discrimination based on polyamory, society should protect against such discrimination 
regardless of whether the victim was actually polyamorous in order to stake out a place for polyamory in 
American culture.  On the other hand, however, in cases where the victim does not actually espouse 
polyamory, it may be difficult to sort out the difference between discrimination based on perceived 
polyamory and that based on perceived non-monogamy more generally.  Assuming that it is not socially 
desirable at this time to protect all those who are non-monogamous from discrimination, the perceived 
category should arguably be omitted from any anti-discrimination provisions that include polyamory. 
 185. Cf. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 152 (describing the empowering effect of naming new 
forms of sexuality). 
 186. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 24, at 527, 549. 
 187. In addition to laws such as those enforcing monogamy by criminalizing bigamy and adultery, 
Emens points to statements in case law that emphasize the importance of monogamy.  Emens, supra 
note 69, at 291.  For instance, the Tenth Circuit has described monogamy as “‘the bedrock upon which 
our culture is built,’” and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in its opinion upholding the 
right to same sex marriage, used the word “exclusive” six times.  Id. (quoting Potter v. Murray City, 760 
F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985)) (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003)).  She further describes “condemnation of divorce, both historical and extant” as evidence of the 
enforcement of monogamy.  Id.  For an example of a court’s enforcing a harsh divorce law and tying its 
decision to the norms of monogamy, see Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908).  In Lanham, 
the court stated that the “sacredness of marriage and the stability of the marriage lie at the very 
foundation of Christian civilization and social order.”  Id. at 788.  The court further explained that, if it 
were to allow easy divorces, it would be allowing “those who have become tired of one union . . . to 
collusively procure the severance [of it] for the purpose of experimenting with another partner, and 
perhaps yet another, thus accomplishing what may be called progressive polygamy.”  Id. at 789.  In 
terms of examples that pertain to American culture more broadly, Emens describes the pervasiveness of 
the ideas “that jealousy is . . . evidence of love, and . . . that jealousy may be understood to define 
romantic love” to demonstrate the “cultural law” of monogamy.  Emens, supra note 69, at 289–90.  
Additionally, one need only think of the cultural force of terms like “slut” and “whore” to understand the 
force of the prescription of monogamy. 
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b. Criminal Law Is Currently and Has Historically Been Used to 
Enforce the Requirement of Monogamy 
Marriage has been described as “monogamy’s core institution.”188  
Accordingly, laws designed to protect or encourage monogamous 
marriage or to penalize violations of its principles are properly seen as 
mechanisms to enforce monogamy.  Thus, bigamy and adultery laws are 
explicitly designed to enforce monogamy as a cultural requirement.189  
These laws are examples of society, through the coercive mechanism of 
criminal law, explicitly punishing non-monogamy in order to privilege 
and cultivate monogamy.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized, applying the sanctions of criminal law to a type of conduct 
severely burdens the right to engage in that conduct, irrespective of the 
magnitude of the criminal penalty imposed.190  Such laws demonstrate 
the extent to which the norms of monogamy are, and have been 
historically, entrenched in the law and thus the extent to which such 
norms affect the law, which are important questions according to 
Cooper’s methodology.  Additionally, such examples show that the law 
can be properly thought of as creating two classes of people—those who 
abide by the prescription of monogamy and are allowed to go free and 
those who violate it and have their freedom compromised. 
c. The Special Rights Attendant on Marriage 
The law confers on married couples a host of special rights.191  In 
terms of federal law alone, the General Accounting Office has identified 
1,138 provisions of the United States Code in which “marital status is a 
factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges.”192  In 
 188. Emens, supra note 69, at 187. 
 189. Id. at 284, 355.  Additionally, the United States historically also used criminal sanctions to 
force a monogamous conception of marriage on Native cultures.  ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 101–02 (2008). 
 190. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–76 (2003) (stating that “the stigma imposed 
[by Texas’s law criminalizing homosexual sodomy] is not trivial” and describing the law’s import “for 
the dignity of the persons charged”); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (recognizing that 
criminal jurisdiction “involves a far more direct intrusion on personal liberties” than civil jurisdiction), 
superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 191. See, e.g., Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive 
Considerations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV. 595, 598–99, 
598 n.10 (2004); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“The benefits accessible only 
by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death.”); POLIKOFF, 
supra note 21, at 7–8 (explaining that “people in any relationship other than marriage suffer [due to the 
legal privileging of marriage], sometimes to a level of economic or emotional devastation” and noting 
some of the rights and privileges that marriage confers). 
 192. Suffredini & Findley, supra note 191, at 598 n.10 (internal quotation marks & citations 
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addition to the rights and privileges conferred by federal law, such as tax 
breaks and social security benefits, available solely to married persons, 
states grant numerous exclusive privileges and rights.193  For example, 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,194 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, “[w]ith no attempt to be comprehensive,” listed 
an impressive array of rights and benefits available exclusively to 
married persons under Massachusetts law, noting that they “touch[ed] 
nearly every aspect of life and death.”195  The acknowledged breadth of 
laws conferring exclusive rights on married persons demonstrates that 
the class of married persons is privileged, while the opposing category 
of unmarried persons is correspondingly disfavored under the law.  
Because marriage as defined in our culture is necessarily a two-person 
relationship, premised on and reifying monogamy, the numerosity 
requirement of which is virtually beyond dispute,196 the disfavored class 
necessarily includes polyamorists and other non-monogamists, who are 
stained by their refusal to abide by this core societal norm.197 
d. The Burdening of Non-Marital Children 
By definition, non-marital children are the product of a relationship 
that lacked the imprimatur of monogamy that marriage provides.  The 
extent to which the law has historically,198 and to some extent continues 
to, oppress such children199 demonstrates Western culture’s extreme 
omitted). 
 193. See id. 
 194. 798 N.E.2d 941. 
 195. Id. at 955–56 (citations omitted). 
 196. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 69, at 281; accord Kurtz, supra note 15, at 2 (“Americans still 
take it for granted that marriage means monogamy.”). 
 197. Of course, legal benefits conferred on married persons harm others besides non-
monogamists.  See POLIKOFF, supra note 21, at 7; cf. id. at 50–51 (discussing efforts in Madison, 
Wisconsin to craft a domestic partnership ordinance that would be inclusive of diverse types of 
families); Barbara J. Cox, Alernative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through 
Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 131 (2000) (discussing the 
content of the Madison, Wisconsin ordinance).  It appears, however, that such laws may well have been 
designed to harm those who do not engage in monogamy in order to encourage monogamy.  See, e.g., 
POLIKOFF, supra note 21, at 8, 21. 
  It is also worth noting that some married persons do engage in polyamory, thus breaching the 
norms and ideals of traditional marriage.  See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 75, at 277 (discussing a 
polyamorous woman’s difficulty in getting her child’s natural father’s name listed on the child’s birth 
certificate because the woman was married to someone else at the time of the child’s birth); Bennett, 
supra note 71 (discussing a married couple who engage in polyamory). 
 198. Susan E. Satava, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child and the 
Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 935–36, 937, 939 (1996). 
 199. Id. at 942–43, 948.  See also Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two 
Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. 
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veneration of monogamy.  The continuing significance of legitimacy, 
and particularly the historical oppression of non-marital children under 
the law, presents one of the most poignant examples of the structuring of 
the law to materially favor those who are associated with monogamy 
and to correspondingly burden those who lack the association, even 
when the legal distinctions being made pertain to children who had no 
choice in their parents’ actions.  Thus, the distinction between marital 
and non-marital children also indicates that an “organising principle of 
inequality” is at stake when it comes to those who practice non-
monogamy, including polyamorists.200 
e. Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Marriage, Monogamy, and Filiation 
 In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,201 the United States Supreme Court 
upheld California’s filiation law under which judicial determinations of 
paternity are made.  A biological father challenged the law, asserting 
claims under: (1) the Equal Protection Clause; (2) substantive due 
process; and (3) procedural due process.  The child also challenged the 
law based on her substantive due process and Equal Protection Clause 
rights.  The Court held that the law, which had been used to deprive the 
natural father of his parental rights, was constitutional because the 
biological father had procreated with a woman who was already married 
and the child was therefore, under California law, presumptively the 
child of the mother’s husband. 
In a plurality opinion, Justice Scalia paternalistically expressed alarm 
at the wife’s multiple affairs, exclaiming that “[t]he facts of this case are, 
we must hope, extraordinary.”202  He also attempted to reify monogamy 
as a law of nature, stating that “California law, like nature itself, makes 
no provision for dual fatherhood.”203  Thus, the plurality, alluding to the 
“sanctity” “traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop 
within the unitary family,” rejected the biological father’s argument that 
the Court had previously recognized a liberty interest “created by 
biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship.”204  
REV. 567, 580 n.68 (2009) (discussing the use of intermediate scrutiny to evaluate distinctions based on 
legitimacy); Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (discussing the 
meaningfulness of the marital/non-marital distinction in social contexts and the fact that marital children 
still have an easier time demonstrating eligibility for government benefits). 
 200. COOPER, supra note 16, at 66. 
 201. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 202. Id. at 113 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 203. Id. at 118.  Nancy Levit describes Michael H. as an opinion “that may have gotten it flat 
wrong on love.”  Levit, supra note 30, at 26. 
 204. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123. 
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Additionally, the plurality explained that the “‘unitary family[]’ is 
typified . . . by the marital family” and that it would “bear no 
resemblance to traditionally respected relationships—and [would] cease 
to have any constitutional significance—if it [were] stretched so far as to 
include the relationship established between a married woman, her 
lover, and their child.”205 
Given the importance that the Court places on the rights of biological 
parents in other contexts,206 Michael H. stands out as a striking example 
of the extent to which a natural parent may be punished for violating the 
laws of monogamy.207  Moreover, the opinion clearly sets out married 
persons as a privileged class when it comes to parental rights, and these 
privileges are undoubtedly tied to the presumption of monogamy that 
comes with marriage.208  The opposing binary, represented by the 
unmarried adulterous biological father, is utterly stripped of rights 
because his relationship with the child’s mother and their daughter 
“bear[s] no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships.”209  
Given the plurality’s focus on tradition, it can be inferred that the Court 
would have a similar reaction if faced with natural parents who were 
engaged in polyamorous relationships. 
f. Monogamy’s Power to Make Sadomasochism Palatable to Courts 
Finally, Ummi Kahn’s examination of societal tolerance for 
sadomasochistic (S/M) relationships through the lenses of both film and 
case law provides strong evidence of the continuing force of the norms 
of monogamy in both the legal system and popular culture.210  
Specifically, with respect to the legal system, she concludes that “the 
judging community . . . is more lenient with SM that is positioned within 
heterosexual, marital, and monogamous confines.”211  Her conclusion is 
 205. Id. at 123 n.3; see also Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 
YALE L.J. 1236, 1252 (2010) (“Constitutional doctrine’s clear preference for the marital nuclear 
family . . . is evident in a number of contexts.”). 
 206. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  Murray and Ristroph note that Troxel may 
be “understood as endorsing the primacy of the nuclear family model over claims for alternative family 
structures.”  Ristroph & Murray, supra note 205, at 1255. 
 207. The putative father, Michael H., had had a blood test that “showed a 98.07% probability” that 
he was the child’s natural father.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. 
 208. See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 205, at 1256 (arguing that, in cases where the 
Supreme Court has recognized unmarried fathers’ rights, the recognition was due to the fact that the 
fathers acted as though they were married to the mothers of the children at issue). 
 209. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3. 
 210. See generally Ummi Kahn, A Woman’s Right to be Spanked: Testing the Limits of Tolerance 
of SM in the Socio-Legal Imaginary, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 79 (2009). 
 211. Id. at 82. 
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based on her examination of several British criminal cases involving 
S/M and one such case from the United States.212  Kahn explains that 
“only marital love[] seems to operate as a kind of emotional alibi to 
justify the unusual behavior” that comprises S/M practices213 and further 
that “being married, heterosexual and monogamous” appears to “buy 
some leniency” in an S/M case.214  Given S/M’s status as a suspect, 
fringe practice, “guilty until proven innocent in the socio-legal 
imaginary,”215 it is remarkable that opposite-sex marriage can, at least to 
some degree, ameliorate the practice in the eyes of the law and mitigate 
the penalties for those charged, at least if they fall into the privileged 
categories.  In short, Kahn’s research demonstrates the privilege that 
monogamy affords and, conversely, the disadvantage that non-
monogamy necessarily carries with it.216 
The many ways that monogamy (as represented by marriage) is 
privileged under the law, while non-monogamy is burdened, 
demonstrate that non-monogamous persons, including polyamorists, are 
oppressed under an “organising principle of inequality” and therefore 
that they meet Cooper’s test for extension of legal protections.  Notably, 
the above analysis may also support protecting a broader class of non-
monogamous persons than simply polyamorous persons; however, more 
analysis is necessary to determine whether the types of non-monogamies 
that would be protected represent identities that are sufficiently deeply 
embedded and whether these other types of non-monogamies could be 
reasonably expected not to harm others.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
this Article, the legal distinctions between monogamy and non-
monogamy are only used to support protections for polyamory. 
IV. QUESTIONS WARRANTING FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
As demonstrated above, expanding the definition of sexual orientation 
to include polyamory for purposes of anti-discrimination law appears to 
be a reasonable choice.  The current definition of “sexual orientation,” 
specifically its exclusive focus on the sex of those to whom one is 
attracted, appears to be somewhat arbitrary as a conceptual matter.  
Moreover, there are problems with the current notion of sexual 
orientation, particularly with attempts to essentialize the category.  It is 
possible that these problems could be ameliorated, at least to some 
 212. Id. at 102–03. 
 213. Id. at 110. 
 214. Id. at 112. 
 215. Id. at 118. 
 216. See id. at 112–16 (discussing Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)). 
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extent, by opening up the category to other types of sexual preferences, 
thereby broadening the focus and potentially softening the rigid 
expectations that are now placed on an individual based on her attraction 
to one sex, the other, or both. 
A. Similarities Between Traditional Sexual Orientation and Polyamory 
As previously demonstrated, polyamory shares some of the attributes 
of sexual orientation as currently understood.  First, as is evident from 
Lau’s work, both sexual orientation and polyamory are relationship-
based.  Moreover, polyamory appears to share both of the potentially 
problematic aspects of sexual orientation identified by Butler.  For one, 
polyamory, like sexual orientation, has a significant performative 
component, in the sense that having, or at least desiring, multiple 
relationships is a central part of the essence of polyamory. 
As Butler’s work suggests, given the performative aspect of sexual 
orientation, there may be something incongruous about portraying it as a 
static identity, because it has to be continually reaffirmed through future 
performance.  Relatedly, on a more practical level, women’s sexual 
desires are subject to a considerable degree of fluidity.217  This means 
that a significant portion of, or perhaps most, women are likely to 
experience changes in their sexual identities during the course of their 
adult lives.218  The fact that the performative aspect of sexual orientation 
identified by Butler accords with empirical evidence as to women’s 
sexual identities suggests that, rather than trying to minimize the 
performative aspect of sexual orientation (and the concomitant potential 
for fluctuations in the objects of a person’s desires), as legal strategies 
likening sexual orientation to race and other more static identities have 
traditionally sought to do, society and the legal system should embrace 
the performative aspect of sexual orientation.219  In turn, the fact that 
polyamory also has a performative aspect may mean that: (1) it makes 
logical sense to group protections for sexual orientation discrimination, 
 217. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 84–86; see also Glazer, supra note 21 (manuscript at 34) 
(“Understanding sexual orientation to fit within a rigid binary has been deemed problematic because that 
binary is too rigid to capture the actual human experience of sexual orientation, which is dynamic and 
fluid.”). 
 218. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 82–88. 
 219. Id. at 16 (“The well-being of all women will be improved through a more accurate, 
comprehensive understanding of female sexuality in all its diverse and fluid manifestations.”).  For an 
example of an attorney’s strategic portrayal of sexual orientation as static in the courtroom in the hopes 
of gaining legal protections, see Glazer, supra note 21 (manuscript at 30) (discussing the trial in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), and documenting the plaintiffs’ attorney’s 
implicit concession that one of the plaintiffs was entitled to protection “if and only if her gay identity 
[was] stable”). 
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as traditionally understood, with any such protections that might be 
established for polyamory; and (2) although such a move may make the 
performative aspect of sexual orientation more visible, this could well be 
desirable rather than problematic. 
Professor Butler also pointed out that homosexual sexual orientation 
is inherently unstable because it is the derided opposite of heterosexual 
sexual orientation, and both are mutually dependent on each other for 
their meanings.  Similarly, polyamory, or, more broadly, non-
monogamy, has been socially constructed as the derided copy of 
monogamy,220 and yet the concept of monogamy would itself not exist 
without its culturally scorned opposite.  This similarity reveals that both 
types of identity derive their meanings from the larger culture, and it 
thus demonstrates that polyamory shares another important attribute of 
homosexuality, namely its conceptual instability. 
While, at first glance, these problems may seem like reasons not to 
expand the category of sexual orientation to include polyamory, in fact it 
may be beneficial to come to terms with the inherent instability of sexual 
orientation and the related fact that it is an identity that is different in 
kind than race and ethnicity, the more traditional types of identity.  To 
the extent that American culture can come to a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of sexual orientation and begin to protect against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation not because the category is 
like race and other protected categories but simply because it warrants 
protection, it will be better off.  Lau’s work demonstrating that sexual 
orientation is relationship-based also provides support for grouping 
polyamory and traditional sexual orientation together.  The considerable 
discrimination that polyamorists face and the fact that they, along with 
other non-monogamists, are burdened by an organizing principle of 
inequality further support the move to expand the definition. 
B. Potential Drawbacks to Expanding the Definition of Sexual 
Orientation 
Despite the preceding analysis, polyamory appears to be a somewhat 
less embedded identity than traditional sexual orientation.  If a high level 
of embeddedness continues to be seen as an important characteristic of a 
protected class, this factor could cut against expanding the definition.221  
 220. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 69, at 294–97 (describing biological anthropologists’ attempts to 
describe monogamy as natural and non-monogamy as unnatural for humans). 
 221. For example, including polyamory within the ambit of sexual orientation for purposes of 
anti-discrimination law could potentially reduce the ability of advocates for homosexual rights to make 
essentialist arguments.  See, e.g., Halley, supra note 18, at 65–66.  It may well be that such arguments 
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The recent evidence discussed above, however, demonstrates that 
women’s sexual identities, in many cases, are fluid and subject to 
change,222 a fact which may indicate that what is important about sexual 
orientation, namely the capacity of desires and intimate relationships to 
shape the individual and her sense of self, is unrelated to its level of 
embeddedness.  As this view of sexual orientation comes to be more 
widely embraced, adding to the definition to include preferences such as 
polyamory should become correspondingly less risky. 
Relatedly, if polyamory is added to the definition of “sexual 
orientation,” there is a danger that identities based on same-sex 
attraction and other protected classes will become irrevocably associated 
in judicial, political, and popular discourse with polyamorous identity, 
especially to the extent that lawyers arguing on behalf of polyamorists 
draw explicit or implicit comparisons with these other groups.223  For 
example, adding polyamory to the definition of sexual orientation could 
increase the perception that sexual orientation is a chosen or ideological 
matter,224 which could be detrimental to the fight to gain more 
protections against sexual orientation discrimination, at least in the short 
term.  A careful examination of the possible effects of both types of 
conflation—between polyamory and LGB identities and between 
polyamory and other protected categories—would need to be made 
before polyamory was added to the definition of “sexual orientation.”225 
Indeed, polyamory is a somewhat different type of identity than 
others that are currently protected in that it is explicitly based on values 
such as honesty and in that one of its central components, non-
monogamy, is shared—in at least its nascent form of non-monogamous 
desire—by virtually everyone.  In this sense, expanding the definition of 
sexual orientation to include polyamory could “place the ontology of 
identity itself at risk.”226  While values also often play a role in 
are ultimately destructive to LGB rights, that they should be abandoned across the board in anti-
discrimination law, or that making them on behalf of LGB plaintiffs has negative reverberations in other 
areas of anti-discrimination law, id., but the potential for reducing the viability of making such 
arguments should nonetheless be evaluated carefully before any decisions are made. 
 222. See, e.g., supra note 34 (discussing Lisa Diamond’s work). 
 223. Halley, supra note 18, at 62–68. 
 224. Diamond explains that the fluidity of women’s sexual desires does not mean that they are 
chosen by women or subject to the individual woman’s control.  DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 11. 
 225. Halley, supra note 18, at 64 (“[I]magining a rights-claiming project without anticipating or 
resisting the racial resignifications it may produce is to fail to imagine well at all.”). 
  One immediately obvious possible point of conflation is that LGB persons could come to be 
more readily perceived as non-monogamous.  This conflation between the identities would most likely 
further tarnish the image of LGB persons in the public eye and reinforce the stereotype that LGB 
persons, especially men, are promiscuous. 
 226. Id. at 65. 
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individuals’ conceptions of their sexual orientations,227 it probably 
cannot be said that values are as significant a part of sexual orientation 
as they are of polyamory.  Again, perhaps ideally, sexual orientation 
could be understood as more analogous to religion228—not necessarily 
as something that never changes but as something that the state should 
simply not ask a person to try to change, and indeed should support, as a 
crucial aspect of an individual’s self-development.  As this view 
becomes more widely embraced,229 the risks of adding polyamory to the 
definition of sexual orientation will decrease.  The question is what to do 
in the meantime.  While there are no easy answers, careful evaluations 
of risk are surely warranted.  If it turns out that it is considered too risky 
to add polyamory to existing definitions of sexual orientation, other 
possibilities for protecting polyamory should be explored.230 
C. Do Polyamorists Want Specific Legal Protections? 
A related and equally crucial question that warrants additional 
research is whether polyamorists desire protection.  The evidence 
collected so far appears to be conflicting.  For instance, Rambukkana 
has explicitly resisted making any claim to a queer identity based on his 
polyamory because he believes “it is not politically viable with respect 
to current identity politics and [it] might erode the radical potential of 
the queer subject position.”231  While some queer theorists may disagree 
with his limited view of queerness,232 other polyamorists, at least in the 
Bay Area, have also “expressed an unwillingness to raise their public 
profile, in fear that such a move might . . . ‘sabotage[e] [sic] the case of 
our gay and lesbian brothers and sisters[.]’”233  Aviram also argues that 
 227. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing COOPER, supra note 16; Sedgwick, 
supra note 16; Rambukkana, supra note 16). 
 228. Cf. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 205, at 1276 (“Religious beliefs often are not a matter of 
choice [and] that is why they should be protected . . . .”). 
 229. Similar views appear to be gaining traction.  See, e.g., M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, 
Moving Beyond the “Immutability Debate” in the Fight for Equality After Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 
27–33 (2009). 
 230. For instance, there is an emerging literature on discrimination against single people.  See, 
e.g., Barnes & Jones, supra note 139; see generally Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number: The 
Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010).  If further research were to 
reveal that it was strategically undesirable to define sexual orientation to include polyamory, a new 
category of protections based on relationship status could be forged that would include singles, polys, 
and other types of disfavored relationships.  Other viable options for protecting polyamory undoubtedly 
exist as well. 
 231. Rambukkana, supra note 16, at 151; see also SPAHR, supra note 62, at 173 (expressing 
similar sentiments). 
 232. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 102, at 192–93. 
 233. Aviram, supra note 67, at 273. 
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Bay Area polyamorists’ values are inconsistent with advocating a rights-
based view of identity.234  On the other hand, polyamorists in one survey 
listed employment discrimination as one of their top three legal 
issues,235 a fact which suggests a desire for legal protections.  It is 
possible that the views of the polyamorists in Aviram’s research are 
largely unique to the Bay Area, given the region’s relative tolerance for 
diversity of sexual preferences (or that these views are limited to the 
context of the struggle for marriage equality).  Indeed, it may well be 
that, in less tolerant geographical areas, polyamorists do not feel that 
they have the luxury of foregoing efforts to gain legal protection.  
Additionally, the group’s failure to speak up may be due to a tendency to 
remain closeted out of fear.236  If this is the case, the harm that they 
experience as a result of closeting is probably significant and may be a 
reason in itself to seek to include them in legal protections.237  It is, 
however, clear that more research into polyamorists’ views regarding, 
and interest in, anti-discrimination protections must be done before any 
major effort to secure such rights is undertaken. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because polyamory appears to be at least moderately embedded as an 
identity, because polyamorists face considerable discrimination, and 
because non-monogamy is an organizing principle of inequality in 
American culture, anti-discrimination protections for polyamorists are 
warranted.  Moreover, polyamory shares some of the important 
attributes of sexual orientation as traditionally understood, so it makes 
conceptual sense for polyamory to be viewed as part of sexual 
orientation.  On the other hand, however, some of our culture’s 
cherished myths about sexual orientation, especially its 
unchangeableness, would have to be given up to make such a change.  In 
the short-term, this could well be very risky for existing sexual 
orientation protections and it could make some legal strategies in sexual 
orientation cases, such as analogizing sexual orientation to race, 
obsolete.  In the long run, however, it would arguably be better 
culturally to come to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of 
sexual orientation that is not based on its similarity to other identities.  
Moreover, to the extent that polyamorists want legal protection, an issue 
 234. See generally Aviram, supra note 92. 
 235. Emens, supra note 69, at 331 n.316. 
 236. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 75, at 277–78 (discussing interviewees who remained closeted at 
work out of fear). 
 237. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 24, at 527, 549. 
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that needs further investigation, it would be a beneficial move in terms 
of social justice to add polyamory to definitions of sexual orientation 
and thereby protect a societally disfavored group from discrimination.  
Finally, assuming polyamorists do desire legal protections, there may be 
ways to obtain them without defining polyamory as a sexual 
orientation.238  Such possibilities should also be investigated. 
 238. See, e.g., supra note 230. 
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